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Educational Accommodation and Distributive Equity: 
The Principle of Proportionate Progress
TALHA SYED
What do we owe students who, on account of disability, have differential needs 
and capacities from others? What, for that matter, do we owe all students? A central 
claim of the present Article is that we cannot answer the former question without 
also considering the latter. Moreover, a satisfactory answer requires reaching 
beyond notions of “equality of opportunity,” to probe our deepest commitments 
regarding distributive equity, or substantive fairness in access to the good of 
educational development. This Article offers a novel understanding of these deepest 
commitments, to advance a new principle of distributive justice, the principle of 
proportionate priority. It pursues the implications of this principle in depth for the 
specific setting of educational accommodation for disability—to provide a 
comprehensive answer to a question recently before the Supreme Court. Its 
ramifications extend, however, far more widely, not only for educational policy in 
general, but also for other areas of law and policy.
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The Principle of Proportionate Progress
TALHA SYED *
INTRODUCTION
What does fair educational opportunity mean for students who, on 
account of disability, have differential needs and capacities from others? 
For more than thirty years, this question has stymied courts and 
commentators in their efforts to determine the appropriate scope and guiding 
principles of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1
While the law entitles eligible students to individualized education programs 
that provide “adequate” educational benefit,2 what counts as adequate has 
never been satisfactorily answered. Indeed, the question was recently again 
before the United States Supreme Court, which had decided—in the face of 
unflagging controversy and a circuit split over its landmark 1982 decision, 
Board of Education v. Rowley3—to revisit its own prior efforts in this 
regard.4
                                                                                                                         
* University of California, Berkeley School of Law. This Article has had a long period of gestation. 
The principle of distributive justice advanced here was first presented at the Petrie-Flom Bioethics and 
Health Law & Policy Seminar at Harvard Law School in 2008, and I thank the Petrie-Flom Center for its 
generous support of that research. Subsequent iterations of the argument have been presented at faculty 
talks at the University of Colorado, University of Seattle, Emory University, UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC 
Davis, University of Michigan, USC Gould and UT Austin law schools, as well as the Bay Area Forum 
for Law & Ethics (BAFFLE), the Law & Politics seminar at Tel Aviv University, and health law seminars
at Harvard University, the University of Colorado, and the University of Tulsa. Thanks to participants 
on those occasions for helpful feedback and discussion. For specific comments on prior presentations of 
the argument, thanks to Afra Asharipour, Yishai Blank, Anupam Chander, Norm Daniels, Einer Elhauge,
Leslie Francis, Jasmine Harris, Niko Kolodney, Roy Kreitner, Chris Kutz, Gillian Lester, David 
Lieberman, Orly Lobel, Arnulf Becker Lorca, Lisa Ikemoto, Arti Rai, Eric Rakowski, Larry Sager, 
Shayak Sardar, Anita Silvers, Sarah Song, Madhavi Sunder, Jay Wallace, and Dennis Ventry. For helpful 
feedback on a written draft, thanks to Yochai Benkler, Glenn Cohen, Meir Dan-Cohen, Terry Fisher, 
Darien Shanske, Steve Sugarman, and Aaron Tang. Oren Bracha, Anna di Robilant, and Roni Mann went 
above and beyond in their extremely close engagement with the argument of the Article, and for that I 
owe a very special thanks. My deepest gratitude is to Saki Bailey.
1 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2012).
2 See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
3 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley (Rowley II), 458 U.S. 176 (1982). See generally infra Part I.A (reviewing 
the circuit split and controversy in the wake of Rowley II).
4 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). This Article 
was completed before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Endrew. As discussed in the 
Afterword, the Court’s decision only serves to underline the significance of the Analysis offered here.
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This Article offers a comprehensive answer, by advancing a new 
principle of distributive justice. It first reconceives the issue of adequate 
benefits as one of distributive equity, rather than nondiscrimination or 
equality of opportunity. The central problem posed by adequate benefits is 
neither: (a) to secure similar treatment for those similarly situated by 
removing illegitimate barriers to formal equality of opportunity; nor even, 
(b) to secure “fair” equality of opportunity by tailoring otherwise-legitimate 
procedural requirements for those differentially situated.5 Rather, it is to 
secure students effective access to a substantive benefit: educational
development. When it comes to formative education, our aspiration is best 
conceived in terms not only of “leveling the playing field” to ensure a truly 
fair process of competition, but also of securing fair access to educational 
development, seen as an intrinsically valuable good for each student. 
Students with a disability are differentially situated in respect of that purpose 
because, in the language of distributive justice, they face a “conversion 
deficit”: a deficit in translating a given bundle of means (educational 
resources) into valuable ends (educational development).6 Our aim is to 
correct for the insensitivity of formal equality of resources to their special 
needs, so as to secure them substantively fair access to educational 
development. And in doing so, there is no plausible alternative to addressing 
this head-on as a question of distributive equity: a question, that is, of 
prioritizing among similarly legitimate claims to resources—both the special 
needs of students with disability and the needs of other students—for the 
sake of securing all students fair access to the good of educational 
development.7
What, then, is a fair distribution of educational resources—one that 
provides students with disability equitable access to the good of educational 
development, by attending simultaneously both to their special needs and to 
the similarly legitimate claims of other students? 
The Article first examines existing answers to this question, 
reconstructing current judicial standards and scholarly proposals into 
principles of distributive equity. Does fair access require equality in overall 
educational development? Does it require equality in access to educational 
improvements? Does it require maximizing overall levels—either of all 
students, those worst off, or those with disability? Does it require 
maximizing improvements across students? Or, does it simply require 
ensuring that each student can attain a decent basic level of development
and, if so, how robust or minimal a level should we aim for? 
                                                                                                                         
5 As may be the case, for example, with accommodating disability in employment settings. See infra 
notes 106, 117 and accompanying text.
6 See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 28–29, 33–34 (1992).
7 This might be thought to overlook the “disparate impact” branch of antidiscrimination law, but, 
as discussed below, disparate-impact analysis as it has developed in the context of disability 
accommodation sheds little added light here. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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Versions of each of these principles presently lurk within the existing 
legal standards, as stated in their current, ambiguous forms. Rendering these 
standards’ tacit distributive directives more explicit and precise allows us, 
first, to identify more clearly and thus assess more crisply their concrete 
implications in different cases. Even more importantly, it enables us to go 
deeper and unearth and reflect upon the underlying notions of fairness upon 
which these standards ultimately rest.
Subjecting existing principles to such critical examination, we find that 
each founders on its troubling implications in an important subset of cases. 
Some fail to give adequate consideration to the costs of further educational 
improvements for those with disability; others, to the greater urgency of 
improvements for those remaining much worse off than others; and still 
others, to both. And in each case these defects on the surface stem, 
ultimately, from deeper flaws in the premises underlying the principles—in 
their most basic commitments concerning distributive fairness. Reflecting 
the reigning views in distributive justice theory more generally, each of these 
principles rests ultimately on one of three commitments: equality, 
sufficiency, or maximization. 
This Article advances a new answer to the question, in contrast to the 
reigning principles grounded in equality, sufficiency, or maximization.8
It does so by arguing for a deep shift at the level of our most fundamental 
commitments in matters of distributive fairness—to generate, at the surface, 
a new principle of distributive justice that persuasively handles the full range 
of cases we face.
The central claim of the Article is that, in matters of distributive justice, 
our general commitment to equal concern in political morality is best 
understood not to require, even as a default, any commitment to equalizing 
as valuable for its own sake.9 Rather, it should be understood as a 
commitment to enabling each person’s life to go as well as is possible and 
fair. And what is fair is that those who are, through no fault of their own, 
worse off than others be given priority because they are worse off. This is 
not because we aim to decrease inequality for its own sake,10 but rather 
because gains for a person, or improvements in her or his life, have greater 
                                                                                                                         
8 This includes “prioritarian” principles, which generalize the sufficiency view with their notion of 
non-comparative priority. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
9 This is in contrast to the most influential views in distributive justice theory. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54–55, 130–31 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999) (1971) (adopting as a default 
premise a commitment to distributional equality); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 11–14 (2000)
(analyzing distributive justice in terms of two competing theories of distributional equality); SEN, supra 
note 6, at 12–16 (justifying equality as the starting premise for distributive justice). See generally infra
Part II.A.1 (critically evaluating the “telic equality” view that distributional equality is valuable in itself).
10 Inequality may remain important for instrumental reasons. See infra note 142 (identifying distinct 
reasons why distributional equality may remain instrumentally valuable even after rejection of its 
intrinsic value).
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moral significance the lower her or his overall level is compared to that of 
other potential recipients. Why? Because it speaks directly to the question 
of fairness, of what it is reasonable to ask separate persons, leading distinct 
lives, to expect from and sacrifice for each other. Although equalizing does 
not hold out any intrinsic value, nevertheless when deciding between two 
potential recipients of resources, it is only reasonable that one whose life is 
already going better than another’s understand that improvements for the 
latter matter more—are of greater significance or urgency—precisely 
because they are improvements to a life that is going less well.11
Moreover, just as equalizing for its own sake holds no value, so 
maximization for its own sake—irrespective of its impact across distinct 
lives—is implausible. And while a focus on ensuring that all persons attain 
a sufficiently “decent” threshold level is initially more plausible, it finally 
proves untenable as well, because what is decent is ultimately contextual to 
what is possible for others and hence to what is fair.
Making this shift in the fundamental reason for our special concern for 
those with disability sheds new light in determining the extent of that 
concern, or how much priority is merited. Since students with disability are 
given priority because they are worse off, they are to be given priority to the 
extent that they are worse off. They are to be given, in other words, 
comparative priority: their claims on educational resources are greater the 
worse off they are compared to other potential student recipients. 
This then issues in the principle of proportionate progress: students with 
disability should have priority in access to educational resources so long as
(a) the progress that these resources would enable them to realize, as a 
proportion of their existing level of development, is greater than or equal to 
(b) the progress such resources would enable alternative recipients to realize, 
as a proportion of their existing levels of development. Under the principle,
those who are at comparatively lower levels are given greater priority, which 
priority is applied to their respective potentials for improvement. Where the 
two factors of comparative priority and potentials converge, the recipient is 
given especially strong priority.
What matters on this view is neither to equalize the overall levels of all 
students, nor to maximize or “sufficientize” the levels of students with 
disability; nor, for that matter, is it to equalize or maximize improvements 
across all students. Rather, it is to ensure that all students have access to 
meaningful improvements. And the meaning of improvements is to be 
understood inter-subjectively, within and across different students’ 
educational lives, in terms both of how well or badly they are already doing 
                                                                                                                         
11 As elaborated below, it is precisely adoption of a comparative view, but now on grounds of 
fairness rather than equalizing, that distinguishes the present position not only from “equality” views on 
one side, but also, on the other, from non-comparative “priority” and “sufficiency” views. See infra notes 
143 and 161 and accompanying text.
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and of how much or little they stand to improve. Educational gains are to be 
understood, that is, in terms of their interpersonal significance: what they 
signify for each person in the context of her or his own development, 
compared to what the alternative gains for others would signify for them, in 
the context of their own development. 
How does the principle make sense of existing law? Very well. 
Competing legal standards each emphasize, in a one-sided manner, some 
partial set of considerations, including: the infeasibility of maximal benefits, 
especially in cases of severe disability; the implausibility of modest benefits, 
especially in cases of great potential; the need to be sensitive to costs; and 
the need to be sensitive to student diversity.12 By contrast to any alternative 
principle, the proportionate-progress view organically gives—internal to its 
own commitments—each consideration its due, and thus takes them all into 
account in a systematic—that is, comprehensive and consistent—way.13
Moreover, it does so in the right way: evaluating levels in terms of 
comparative priority and improvements in terms of comparative potential, 
so as to integrate them into an analysis of equitable opportunity costs. 
The Article turns, in its final part, to consider how the principle may 
apply in complex cases of educational accommodation. This requires taking 
up the second fundamental debate in distributive justice theory—concerning 
not the appropriate principle of distributive equity, but the appropriate space
of distributive concern. In core cases of accommodation, disability causes 
the student to perform below the average. But what if, as is sometimes the 
case, the student is able to make up for the disadvantage, to achieve results 
on par with, or even superior to, the average? Do there remain grounds for 
special accommodation in such cases? Most courts think not, taking the view 
that when students are average or above, their disabilities can no longer be 
said to “adversely affect” their “educational performance” for purposes of 
IDEA eligibility.14 Some, however, disagree, taking the view that so long as 
the disability may be discerned to have any detrimental effect on 
performance, it “adversely affects” it so as to merit accommodation even if 
the student is overall performing at an average or higher level.15 Both 
positions, so stated, are unsatisfactory and the debate between them lacks 
traction—starting and ending on rival premises concerning the meaning of 
“adversely affect.” Is there a way beyond the impasse? Yes. Seen through 
the lens of distributive justice theory, each position inchoately tracks a 
distinct view of the appropriate “index” of educational advantage for 
distributive concern. Evaluating each in light of the larger debate on that 
                                                                                                                         
12 As reviewed infra Part I.
13 See infra Part II.B.4.
14 See infra notes 193–196 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases that find 
above-average students to be ineligible for special educational services).
15 See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases that allow even 
above-average students to receive special educational services).
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score—featuring the rival candidates of welfare, resources, and 
capabilities—clarifies the substantive stakes of their disagreement and 
works toward its resolution, by specifying more precisely the target space of 
educational advantage to which the principle of proportionate priority should 
apply.
The Article intervenes at two fundamental levels. First, at the level of 
normative first principle, it offers a new elaboration of our deepest 
commitments of distributive fairness, to result in a new principle of 
distributive justice that persuasively addresses the full range of cases—with 
implications for many areas of law and policy. Second, at the level of 
legal-institutional analysis, the Article develops in depth the implications of 
this principle for a specific domain of legal policy, to provide a persuasive 
and comprehensive answer to a question recently before the Supreme Court. 
It does so by reconceiving educational opportunity as an issue of “equitable 
access,” requiring an analysis sounding in distributive equity.
The reconceptualization itself offers three significant contributions. The 
first is to locate the source of the longstanding intractability of the problem 
of adequate benefits—one that has stymied both courts and commentators 
for more than thirty years—in the failure to confront the distributive the 
character of the question, and hence to adopt the mode of analysis needed
for its satisfactory resolution. Second, viewing existing legal positions 
through the lens of distributive justice allows us to formulate more precisely 
the actual directives lurking within them, and thus to evaluate more 
crisply—with greater clarity and depth—their requirements across the range 
of cases. This applies both to different standards for core cases of 
accommodation—which are best understood as inchoately embodying 
different principles of distributive equity—and the debate in complex cases, 
where the contending views are best understood as inchoately tracking 
distinct positions concerning the appropriate space of distributive concern. 
For both, the analytical framework of distributive justice theory throws 
floodlights of clarity on the substantive stakes of the problem and normative 
premises underpinning different solutions. Finally, the particular way in 
which educational opportunity is reconceived—as requiring equitable 
access to educational development—resonates with widely held, if 
inarticulate, commitments in this area. Rethinking our aim here in terms of 
equity of access moves us beyond precisely the impasse articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Rowley, namely that our aspirations in this context are not 
well captured by either equality of opportunity or equality of outcome.16
Each of these fundamental arguments—of reconceiving a question of 
legal policy as one of delimited distributive equity and advancing a new 
principle of distributive justice to aid in its resolution—bear significance for 
many areas of law and policy besides educational accommodation for 
                                                                                                                         
16 See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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disability. The Conclusion briefly canvasses three: educational policy in 
general, disability accommodation outside of education, and equitable 
access to healthcare. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes the current landscape 
of law and policy in educational accommodation. It reviews the intractability 
of the problem of adequate benefits from Rowley to today, diagnoses its 
source in the failure of courts and commentators to confront its distributive 
character, and reconceives the question as one of distributive equity. Part II 
then reconstructs existing and proposed legal standards as principles of 
distributive equity, and evaluates them using an in-depth illustrative case of 
IDEA accommodation. It next advances the principle of proportionate 
priority, as rooted in the most compelling elaboration of our deepest 
commitments in this area, and as providing the most persuasive resolution 
across the full spectrum of cases. Part III examines the principle’s 
application in complex cases of accommodation, taking up the second 
fundamental debate in distributive justice theory, concerning the proper 
index of advantage for distributive concern. The Conclusion points to the 
wider significance of the new principle of distributive justice, for other areas 
of law and policy.17
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE IN EDUCATIONAL ACCOMMODATION
Students with learning disabilities are entitled, under the IDEA, to a 
“free appropriate public education,” in the form of an “individualized 
education program” (IEP) that provides “special education” and “related 
services.”18 Developed in consultation with the child’s parents, an IEP is to 
be devised by the local educational agency upon a thorough evaluation of 
the student’s educational needs.19 It must be suitably tailored to the student’s 
particular needs, and place her or him in the “least restrictive environment” 
appropriate to meeting such needs.20 Removal from the regular classroom 
environment is to occur only when the character or severity of the student’s 
disability means that simply adding supplementary aids and services to the 
regular classroom will not suffice.21
Alongside these formal and procedural requirements, an IEP must also 
satisfy a more substantive obligation, of providing access to some positive 
amount of educational benefit.22 Each IEP must, that is, be reasonably 
                                                                                                                         
17 Following the Conclusion is a brief Afterword that considers how the Article’s analysis bears on 
the recently delivered Supreme Court opinion in the Endrew case.
18 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1), 1401(3)(A), 1401(9), 1412(a)(1), 1412(a)(4) (2012). 
19 Id. at § 1414(a)–(c).
20 Id. at § 1414(d); § 1412(a)(5).
21 34 C.F.R. §300.114(a)(2)(ii) (2016).
22 See Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982) (articulating a two-pronged test for IDEA 
compliance: “First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the 
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calculated to provide the student access to an “adequate” educational 
benefit.23 It is on this question—access to what amount of educational 
benefit should be deemed adequate for purposes of the IDEA—that our 
attention is trained. And it is one that has been subject to intense and 
unflagging judicial and scholarly controversy.
A. The IDEA’s Persistent Puzzle: How Much is “Adequate”?
1. Rowley and Its Aftermath
Leading the way is the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Rowley. At 
issue was the suitability of an IEP for first-grader Amy Rowley, a deaf 
student with minimal residual hearing and excellent lip-reading skills.24
Placed in a regular first-grade classroom, Amy was provided with the 
supplements of a hearing aid, one hour of special instruction each day from 
a tutor for the deaf, and three hours per week of speech therapy.25 Although 
she was achieving above-average grades under this plan, Amy’s parents 
nevertheless believed that she was failing to reach her full potential on 
account of missing too much of what was going on in class by relying on lip
reading (notwithstanding her proficiency in that regard).26 Accordingly, they 
requested that the school provide her an interpreter for all her classes.27 The 
school refused, pointing to Amy’s satisfactory, indeed above-average, 
progress.28
                                                                                                                         
individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits?”); cf. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 
118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997) (glossing Rowley II’s second prong into four factors: “(1) the program 
is individualized on the basis of the student’s assessment and performance; (2) the program is 
administered in the least restrictive environment; (3) the services are provided in a coordinated and 
collaborative manner by the key ‘stakeholders’; and (4) positive academic and non-academic benefits are 
demonstrated”).
23 Rowley II, 458 U.S. at 202, 207. Courts and commentators often use the terms “adequate” and 
“appropriate” interchangeably when referring to the type of special education an IEP must provide to 
satisfy the IDEA’s requirements. In this Article, however, the terms will be taken to have distinct 
meanings. “Appropriate” will be taken as the more general term, to refer to an IEP that is overall 
satisfactory, meeting both the formal and substantive requirements involved in providing a “free and 
appropriate education.” “Adequate,” on the other hand, will be used in a more restrictive sense, to single 
out the substantive element of the IDEA, regarding the required amount of educational benefit to be 
provided, as distinct from requirements concerning the process (e.g., stakeholder consultation) and 
manner (e.g., least-restrictive environment) for determining and providing such benefits. Cf. Roland v. 
Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991, 993–94 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing under the heading of 
“adequacy and appropriateness” the distinct roles of the amount of benefit and manner in which it is 
provided).
24 Rowley II, 458 U.S. at 184.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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A federal district court disagreed with the school. Despite her above-
average performance, Amy, the court found, “understands considerably less 
of what goes on than she could if she were not deaf.”29 Consequently, there 
was ample room for improvement with an interpreter. Since on the court’s 
view an “appropriate education” was one that afforded Amy “an opportunity 
to achieve [her] full potential,”30 failure to provide her an interpreter fell 
considerably short of the required standard.
In overturning, the Supreme Court rejected the district court’s “full 
potential” standard,31 declaring that the IDEA did not require “strict equality 
of opportunity or services;”32 or, indeed, mandate access to any “particular 
level of education.”33 Rather, it aimed simply to ensure a “basic floor of 
opportunity,” so as to provide students with disability effective, rather than 
merely formal, “access” to public education.34 Lest this “opportunity” 
language be taken in a purely procedural vein, the Court did clarify that there 
was a substantive component to the Act’s requirements.35 Although a focus 
on any required maximum or minimum level of educational attainment was 
misplaced, nevertheless an IEP did need to be “reasonably calculated”36 to 
confer access to “some educational benefit.”37
What satisfies this “some benefit” test was, however, left unclear. The 
Court explicitly declined to specify “any one test for determining the 
adequacy of education benefits.”38 And although one factor featured 
prominently in the Court’s discussion—namely, whether the IEP “enable[d]
the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade”—this 
was expressly stated not to be conclusive as sufficient in all cases (nor, 
perhaps, even always necessary).39 The Court held only that in the case 
before it, the fact that Amy was not only passing but also in the upper half 
of her class, did indicate enough of a benefit.40 Going forward, the Court left 
the “difficult problem” of specifying “when handicapped children are 
receiving sufficient educational benefits” to case-by-case determination.41
                                                                                                                         
29 Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. (Rowley I), 483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
30 Id. at 534. 
31 Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982).
32 Id. at 198.
33 Id. at 192.
34 Id. at 200.
35 See id. at 200–01 (“It would do little good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing 
access to a public education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from that education.”).
36 Id. at 204.
37 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
38 See id. at 202 (“We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy 
of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act.”).
39 Id. at 204.
40 Id. at 209–10.
41 Id. at 202.
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Courts have, in the wake of Rowley, struggled to interpret and apply its 
standard. Three main positions have emerged.42
A slight majority of circuits have hewed closely to the “some benefit” 
formulation.43 Central to this approach is an emphasis against any 
requirement that schools provide students with disability an optimal 
education, one that would maximize their potential,44 or that schools enable 
them to attain any other substantive level, such as “self-sufficiency.”45
Rather, so long as access is provided to a serviceable set of benefits—a
“Chevrolet not a Cadillac”46—the requirement is deemed to be met, even if 
an alternative IEP would secure the student greater progress.47
                                                                                                                         
42 See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has 
Been Interpreted, 247 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP.1, 1–4 (Oct. 1, 2009) (describing how the circuit courts have 
interpreted the Rowley standard in a series of cases).
43 See id. at 1–4 (collecting sources establishing that the “majority of the circuits courts, the First, 
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia, have exclusively applied the ‘some
educational benefit’ standard”). The pattern has largely held in subsequent case law, with the possible 
exception of the First Circuit. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 
798 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017); TM ex rel. SM v. Gwinnet Cty. 
Sch. Dist., 646 F. App’x 763, 764 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirming the district court’s application of the “some” 
benefit standard); D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying 
“meaningful” benefit standard, but also invoking cases and language associated with the “some” benefit 
standard); M.B. ex rel. Berns v. Hamilton S.E. Sch., 668 F.3d 851, 860 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying “some 
educational benefit” standard); Sumter Cty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478, 483–84
(4th Cir. 2011) (applying “some educational benefit” standard); CB ex rel. BB v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1
Minneapolis, Minn., 636 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying “some educational benefit” standard).
44 See C.B. ex rel. B.B., 636 F.3d at 989 (“The statute does not require a school district to ‘maximize 
a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense.’”); Hartmann ex rel.
Hartmann v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 1001 (4th Cir. 1997) (“States must . . . confer 
some educational benefit upon the handicapped child, but the Act does not require the furnishing of every 
special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential.”) (internal citations omitted);
Kerkam ex rel. Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Public Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The Act 
does not require that a placement maximize the potential of the handicapped child.”).
45 Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 201 n.23 (1982); Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 
540 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008).
46 See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459–60 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that the IDEA 
requires that “schools provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet to every handicapped 
student. . . . [T]he Board is not required to provide a Cadillac”); J.L. v. Francis Howell R-3 Sch. Dist., 
693 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (“The Act requires only that a student receive sufficient 
specialized services to benefit from his education.” (citing Doe, 9 F.3d at 459–60)); Fayetteville-Parry 
Local Sch. Dist., 20 IDELR 1289, 1302 (SEA Ohio March 8, 1994) (“The argument has been made that, 
under Rowley, public schools are not required to maximize the potential of handicapped children. Stated 
another way, ‘public schools are not required to provide a Cadillac when a Chevrolet will do.’” (citations 
omitted)).
47 See O’Toole ex rel. O’Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 708  
(10th Cir. 1998) (“The fact that [the student] made more progress, and by her parents’ account was 
happier, at the CID, does not compel the conclusion that the CID was the appropriate placement for her 
under the IDEA and Kansas law, and that her IEP as implemented at SEC was inappropriate.”); 
Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding an IEP is not inadequate 
“simply because parents show that a child makes better progress in a different program”); Kerkam,
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What this precisely means in particular cases has, however, remained 
very unclear.48 For instance, although courts under this standard have often 
relied on advancement from grade to grade as a strong indicator of adequate 
benefit,49 others have distanced themselves from any such proxy test,50
pointing to the explicit language and facts of Rowley that suggest the 
contrary.51
A second position has been staked out by the Third Circuit, which has 
emphasized that it is not enough for a school to provide de minimis or 
“trivial” benefits, especially in cases where the student shows considerable 
potential.52 Rather, the benefits must be “meaningful” rather than merely 
“some.”53 The leading case, Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 
16, drew support for its “meaningful benefits” formulation from the IDEA’s 
legislative history and the following statement in Rowley: “Congress did not 
impose upon the States any greater substantive educational benefit than 
would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”54 Clearly, the shift 
from “some” to “meaningful” is meant to signal a strengthening of the 
requirement. Especially since it is accompanied by a shift in emphasis, 
                                                                                                                         
931 F.2d at 86 (holding that the view that where a student is “making progress . . . any inferior placement 
was not appropriate” is “inconsistent with the ‘some educational benefit’ standard of Rowley”).
48 Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law,
2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 565 (2003) (“Despite a myriad of court decisions on the topic, school 
districts, parents, and courts still have little guidance on how to assess FAPE or educational benefit.”).
49 See Todd v. Duneland Sch. Corp., 299 F.3d 899, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that an IEP 
satisfies the IDEA when the disabled child advances “from grade level to grade level while at [public] 
school”); MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 303 F.3d 523, 532 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n 
important measure of an IEP’s success is whether the disabled child has made progress on the basis of 
objective criteria” such as “passing marks and advancement from grade to grade”); Fort Zumwalt Sch. 
Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that advancement from grade to grade was an 
important factor in proving that the disabled child received some benefit from his public education); 
Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 666 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the “IEP afforded 
substantial educational benefits in that John received tutoring in several subject matter areas and received 
passing grades in those areas”); Parent ex rel. Student v. Osceola Cty. Sch. Bd., 59 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1249 
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that the student “progressed through the educational system earning passing 
grades in all his courses”).  
50 See In re Conklin v. Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 306, 314 (1991) (“[A] child’s 
ability or inability to achieve such [passing] marks and progress does not automatically resolve the 
inquiry where the ‘free appropriate public education’ requirement is concerned.”).
51 See R.B., ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(observing that Rowley holds “merely advancing from grade to grade does not automatically satisfy the 
IDEA”); Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that 
Rowley holds “no single substantive standard can describe how much educational benefit is sufficient to 
satisfy” the IDEA). 
52 See Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 180, 182 (3rd Cir. 1986) (the 
IDEA “calls for more than a trivial educational benefit” with an adequate IEP being one that provides
“significant learning,” and where a student displays considerable intellectual potential there must be “a 
great deal more than a negligible” benefit provided).
53 Id. at 182, 184.
54 Id. at 184 (emphasis added) (citing Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).
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underlining the inadequacy of minimal benefits55 rather than the 
non-necessity of maximal ones (which it still affirms).56 Thus, courts 
applying the standard have tended to underscore that grade advancement 
does not by itself signal adequate benefits. 
Nevertheless, ambiguities similar to those facing the “some” standard 
continue to haunt its “meaningful” alternative. These principally concern the 
point at which benefits, while falling short of maximal, become significant 
enough to count as “meaningful” as opposed to merely minimal or modest. 
Additionally, while most courts applying the standard tend to agree on the 
importance of explicitly factoring in a student’s potential,57 they have been 
less forthcoming about how such potential should be factored in—and even 
the need to do so is not always mandated.58
Finally, five circuits have at times used both the “some” and 
“meaningful” benefit standards.59 In some circuits, courts tend to use the 
standards interchangeably, or at least to go back and forth between them in 
                                                                                                                         
55 See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3rd Cir. 1999) (rejecting 
any “bright-line rule” or “single standard” in favor of gauging adequacy of benefits “in relation to the 
child’s potential”).
56 See Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (the “IDEA and case law interpreting 
the statute do not require potential maximizing services. Instead the law requires only that the [plan] in 
place be reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful benefit on the child”); Polk, 853 F.2d at 178–79 
(“However desirable the goal of maximizing each child’s potential may be in terms of individuals, the 
Court obviously recognized that achieving such a goal would be beyond the fiscal capacity of state and 
local governments, and that Congress had realized that fact as well.”).
57 See Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Only by considering 
an individual child’s capabilities and potentialities may a court determine whether an educational benefit 
provided to that child allows for meaningful advancement.”); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247 (“When 
students display considerable intellectual potential, IDEA requires ‘a great deal more than a negligible 
[benefit].’” (quoting Polk, 853 F.2d at 182)).
58 See D.B. ex rel Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2012) (Although “[i]n most 
cases, an assessment of a child’s potential will be a useful tool for evaluating the adequacy of his or her 
IEP[,] . . . there can still be an assessment of . . . a meaningful educational benefit” without it, so that “a 
determination as to a child’s potential for learning and self-sufficiency does not have to precede a 
determination that the child’s IEP complies with the IDEA”).
59 See Wenkart, supra note 42, at 2–3 (collecting sources establishing that “[f]our circuits, the 
Second, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth circuits, have at times used both the ‘some educational benefit’ and 
‘meaningful educational benefit’ standards”). The First Circuit seems recently to have joined this camp. 
See Esposito, 675 F.3d at 34 (discussing both the “some educational benefit” and “meaningful benefit” 
standards).
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different cases.60 In others, there seems to be a gradual drift toward the 
“meaningful” approach.61
The amorphous language of both standards, and the ambiguities 
confronting their respective proxy factors, have led some observers to doubt 
whether any substantive, as opposed to merely terminological, difference 
exists between them, especially given their common roots in Rowley.62
Moreover, that five circuits have shifted from one standard to the other may 
be taken as a signal of further erosion of the distinction between them.63
Others, however, continue to debate the competing merits of the standards, 
on the premise that a significant difference between them remains.64
In principle, there does seem to be a substantive difference between the 
two standards—over and above their differing labels—at least on a point of 
emphasis. Although both standards reject the need for maximal benefits, as 
well as the adequacy of merely trivial ones, it is the former that is leaned on 
heavily by the “some” benefit standard (especially in cases of “severe” 
                                                                                                                         
60 This seems to be the case for the Fifth Circuit. See Klein Independent Sch. Dist. v. Hovem,
690 F.3d 390, 397 (5th Cir. 2012) (invoking both the “meaningful” and “some” educational benefit 
standards). There are similar ambiguities in the Ninth and perhaps also First Circuit. See R.B., ex rel.
F.B. V. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Rowley to adopt the 
“basic floor” language of “some” benefit); N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1209 
(9th Cir. 2008) (adopting “meaningful” benefit language); J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 
951 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010) (expressly stating that its use of the “meaningful” standard remains aligned with 
the mainstream interpretation of Rowley); Esposito, 675 F.3d at 37–38 (ostensibly applying “meaningful” 
standard in a First Circuit decision while also invoking “some” benefit language and cases).
61 This seems to be the case for the Second and Sixth circuits. See Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 
692 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2012); Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 Fed. App’x 968, 974–75 (6th Cir. 
2012) (adopting “meaningful” standard).  
62 See Blake C. ex rel. Tina F. v. Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206 (D. Haw. 
2009) (declaring, “various opinions have left it ambiguous as to what the precise difference, if any, is 
between ‘meaningful’ benefit and ‘some’ benefit”); Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, 
When Good Is No Longer Good Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act 
Supplanted the Rowley Definition of a Free and Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 5, 20–
21 (2012) (stating, “[i]t is unclear whether or not there is any real difference” between the standards or if 
it is merely “semantics”); Wenkart, supra note 42, at 4, 29 (“[T]he use of different terminology does not 
appear to create different substantive standards or lead to different results” and thus “there appears to be 
very little substantive difference between the use of the two terms . . . .”).
63 Wenkart, supra note 42, at 3 (stating that “[t]he use of both terms in these circuits has further 
clouded the distinction between ‘some educational benefit’ and ‘meaningful educational benefit’”).
64 Compare Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the Circuit Courts Defined a Free 
Appropriate Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 25 (2005) (stating that the “some 
educational benefit” is the appropriate standard), with Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding (Fair)well to Due 
Process: The Need for a Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution,
42 J.L. & EDUC. 501, 538 (2013) (stating that the “some benefit” standard is much too low a bar), and
Scott Goldschmidt, A New IDEA for Special-Education Law: Resolving the “Appropriate” Educational 
Benefit Circuit Split and Ensuring a Meaningful Education for Students with Disabilities, 60 CATH. U.L.
REV. 749, 775 (2011) (arguing that “meaningful benefit” is the more appropriate and fair standard), and
Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A Call for Clarity and Change, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 25, 25–26
(2012) (arguing that the some-benefit standard is “counter-intuitive and can create an adversarial 
atmosphere between parents and schools that can lead to litigation”).
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disability),65 while its “meaningful” alternative takes pain to underscore the 
latter (especially in cases of significant potential).66
Nevertheless, in practice neither standard provides much guidance. 
Moreover, at times their application suggests a convergence, hovering 
around a middle ground between “trivial” and “maximal” benefits.67 Indeed, 
the overlap—and attendant uncertainties—can take a disconcerting form. 
Thus, in one case, a court applying the “meaningful” standard upheld an IEP 
as yielding “demonstrable academic . . . benefits” where a dyslexic student 
showed average gains in most educational areas but only very modest ones 
in the areas most directly affected by the condition (reading and writing).68
Yet in another case, an IEP enabling similar progress was held to be 
inadequate under the lower “some” benefit standard.69
2. Post-Rowley Developments
Two sets of developments subsequent to the Rowley decision bear on its 
continued authority in this area. First, at the state level, Rowley established 
a federal floor, not a ceiling, for access to educational benefits for students 
with disability. States are free to legislate more stringent requirements than 
those of the IDEA if they wish.70 And while in practice the vast majority of 
states have implemented language similar to the IDEA, “many deferring or 
                                                                                                                         
65 See Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985) (for “the most severely 
handicapped” students, even “minimal” benefits may be adequate).
66 See Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3rd. Cir. 1986) (where 
a student displays considerable intellectual potential there must be “a great deal more than a negligible” 
benefit provided).
67 Although even here one may wish to stake out a subtle, perhaps elusive, difference concerning 
the desired middle ground, between “modest” versus “significant” benefits. Compare Lenn v. Portland 
Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying the “some” benefit standard to state that the 
IDEA sets “modest goals” in pursuit of “an appropriate rather than an ideal, education”), with Polk,
853 F.2d at 182 (applying the “meaningful” benefit standard to state that the IDEA calls for “significant 
learning”), and D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“Although a state is 
not required to supply an education to a handicapped child that maximizes the child’s potential, it must 
confer an education providing ‘significant learning’ [. . . and . . .] ‘the provision of merely more than a 
trivial educational benefit’ is insufficient.”).
68 Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 343, 347, 349–350, 349–350 n.3 
(5th Cir. 2000).
69 Hall, 774 F.2d at 630, 632, 636. See Johnson, supra note 48, at 566–67 (pointing to Houston and 
Hall as instances where courts “produced varying results with similar information” regarding students’ 
educational improvements, and attributing the variance “to the fact that courts do not have a substantive 
standard” to guide their assessment of “whether a gain of a certain amount is sufficient progress or not”).
70 See Town of Burlington v. Dep’t. of Educ. Com. of Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st Cir. 1984) 
(“Burlington II”), aff’d, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (“[A] state is free to exceed, both substantively and 
procedurally, the protection and services to be provided to its disabled children.”). States may also adopt 
laxer standards if they forgo federal funding, but no state has. Tyce Palmaffy, The Evolution of the 
Federal Role, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 6 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., et al. 
eds., 2001).  
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referring explicitly to the Act,”71 a few states have gone further. At one point 
in time, Massachusetts had legislated a “maximum possible development” 
standard.72 And courts in North Carolina have interpreted its legislative 
mandate of “full educational opportunity” to require the “full potential” 
standard rejected in Rowley.73
On top of legislative requirements, many state constitutions also contain 
clauses relating to education. And numerous state courts have interpreted 
these to require the affirmative provision of a certain level of “adequate 
education” to all students, one going beyond a merely “minimal” amount.74
Two decisions in particular, having broad influence on other state courts, 
merit special mention. In Pauley v. Kelly, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
held that the state had an obligation to develop “every child to his or her 
capacity” along eight dimensions, from literacy, math and creative arts, to 
knowledge of government and “social ethics,” to “self-knowledge,” work 
skills and recreational pursuits.75 And in Rose v. Council for 
Better Education, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the state was 
required to equip each student with “sufficient” capacity in each of seven 
similar dimensions.76 Any such requirements are, under the IDEA, 
incorporated into the conditions that an IEP must comply within that state.77
Second, at the federal level, since its initial passing the IDEA has 
undergone a successive series of statutory amendments, the cumulative 
                                                                                                                         
71 Andrea Blau, The IDEIA and the Right to an “Appropriate” Education, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
1, 15 (2007).
72 See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B, § 2 (West) (2017) (requiring public schools to “assure the 
maximum possible development” of handicapped students, which was amended on January 1, 2002 to 
conform to the federal standard of “free and appropriate public education”); Stock v. Mass. Hosp. Sch., 
467 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Mass. 1984); Roland v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(Massachusetts has “elected to go considerably above the federal floor” by “defin[ing] an appropriate 
education as one assuring the maximum possible development of the child” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).
73 See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-106.1 (providing that the goal of the State is “to provide full 
educational opportunity to all children with disabilities”); Burke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 
895 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that North Carolina requires that students with disability be 
given the opportunity to realize their “full potential commensurate with the opportunity given other 
children”).
74 Johnson, supra note 48, at 568–69.
75 Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979); see also Lujan v. Colorado State 
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 n.23 (Colo. 1982); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985). 
76 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (enumerating the 
seven dimensions as: oral and written communication; knowledge of economic, social, and political 
systems; understanding of government processes; self-knowledge; arts; academic or vocational training; 
academic or vocational skills); see also Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1202 (Kan. 2014); 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec.
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993).    
77 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa)–(bb) (2016); Individualized Education Program (IEP), 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Oct. 4, 2006), https://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/,root,dynamic,
TopicalBrief,10,.html [https://perma.cc/4AEV-WMEZ].
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effect of which suggests an evolution in overall Congressional purpose 
toward stronger, and more substantive, requirements—one that, according 
to many observers, renders the Rowley “some benefit” standard outdated and 
in need of an upgrade.78 Principal among these are amendments in 1997 that 
expressed the importance of upholding “high expectations” for students with 
disability, to ensure that “to the maximum extent possible” such students 
“meet developmental goals and . . . the challenging expectations that have 
been established for all children,” so to equip them “to lead productive and 
independent adult lives.”79 In 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act required 
schools to report on students’ “yearly progress” as part of “ensuring that all 
children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a 
high-quality education,” one that includes “reaching, at a minimum, 
proficiency on challenging state academic achievement standards.”80 And in 
2004 these were consolidated by amendments stipulating more stringent 
standards for special-education teacher training, and for measuring, 
evaluating, and reporting student progress.81
For many observers, then, the upshot of these federal developments is 
twofold. First, to the extent that Rowley’s “basic floor of opportunity” 
language had been interpreted in a largely procedural vein of simply making 
“some” benefit formally available, these changes clearly signal a substantive 
focus on actual outcomes, or effectively enabling real “progress.”82 A shift, 
                                                                                                                         
78 See Regina R. Umpstead, A Tale of Two Laws: Equal Educational Opportunity in Special 
Education Policy in the Age of the No Child Left Behind Act and the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 263 ED. L. REP. 1, 1 (Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter “Umpstead, A Tale of Two Laws”] 
(stating, “each update has been more of a tinkering with the original blueprint of the laws in order to 
advance [Congress’] broader goals”); Regina R. Umpstead, Special Education Assessment Policy Under 
the No Child Behind Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 145, 149 (2009) (stating that Congress is in fact attempting to modify the IDEA and is “critical” 
to policy making surrounding IDEA); Andrea Valentino, The Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act: Changing what Constitutes an “Appropriate” Education, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 139, 
152–55 (2007) (arguing that the legislature is trying to adopt a new “appropriate education” substantive 
standard, overturning the Court’s “some educational benefit” standard).
79 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A) (emphasis added). But cf. L.T. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 
83 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that these amendments change the Rowley standard to one 
requiring “maximum benefit;” interpreting them instead as “simply articulat[ing] the importance of 
teacher training, [not] as overruling Rowley”).
80 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b)(2), 6301 (2015) (requiring yearly reports).
81 See Valentino, supra note 78, at 158–60 (summarizing 2004 amendments).
82 See Philip T.K. Daniel and Jill Meinhardt, Valuing the Education of Students with Disabilities: 
Has Government Legislation Caused a Reinterpretation of a Free Appropriate Public Education?,
222 ED. LAW REP. 515, 535 (stating that the standards-based approach of the statutory modifications 
“shifts the focus from process to outcome and results”); Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE 
Standard Under IDEA, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 377 (2008) (stating that the 1997 and 2004 statutory updates 
to IDEA have an increased focus on “assessing academic progress” and have “clarified the expectations 
for FAPE”); Umpstead, A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 78, at 1 (stating that the No Child Left Behind 
Act was a “unique” shift indicating Congress’ focus on progress assessments); H.R. REP. 105-95 at 
83–84 (May 13, 1997) (“This Committee believes that the critical issue now is to place greater emphasis 
2018] EDUCATIONAL ACCOMMODATION AND DISTRIBUTIVE EQUITY 503
that is, from “some benefit” to “some progress,” at the least. And perhaps 
going further, a second shift to “meaningful progress.”83
The storm clouds, long gathering, have now burst. Last summer, the 
Tenth Circuit declined the invitation to shift, in the face of mounting 
criticism, from the “some” to the “meaningful” standard.84 The Supreme 
Court recently granted certiorari in the case, to revisit the question and, 
perhaps, its own answer in Rowley.85
We may summarize the existing legal landscape as follows. At the 
federal level there exist competing standards of some benefit/progress versus 
meaningful benefit/progress, with ongoing debate concerning the precise 
meaning of each and the differences between them, with the Supreme Court 
now re-entering the fray. Some states, meanwhile, have adopted more 
stringent standards (typically, for all students, not just for those with 
disability), which require the development of student potential up to 
maximal or at least sufficient levels.
B. Rethinking Our Aim: from “Equality of Opportunity” to “Equity of
Access”
1. The Distributive Character of the Question
The Rowley “some benefit” standard has come in for voluminous 
criticism, both on substantive grounds, for embodying too modest a 
commitment and, more formally, for providing too little guidance as to what 
                                                                                                                         
on improving student performance and ensuring that children with disabilities receive a quality public 
education.”); Philip T.K. Daniel, “Some Benefit” or “Maximum Benefit”: Does the No Child Left Behind 
Act Render Greater Educational Entitlement to Students with Disabilities, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 347, 352–53
(2008) (explaining that 1997 and 2004 IDEA amendments, No Child Left Behind, and Federal 
Regulations finalized in 2006 all put greater emphasis on the need for substantive progress). See generally 
Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Razed Rowley
and Raised the Substantive Standard for “Free and Appropriate Public Education”?, 28 NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 397 (2008); Perry A. Zirkel, Is It Time for Elevating the Standard for FAPE Under 
IDEA?, 79 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 497 (2013).
83 Reinforcing this is the view taken by some commentators that the federal circuit split heralds an 
evolution toward the meaningful benefit standard. See David Ferster, Broken Promises: When Does a 
School’s Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Deny a Disabled Student a Free 
and Appropriate Public Education, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 71, 82 (2010) (stating that the circuit shift 
illustrates the “evolving views of special education and the purpose of IDEA”); Amy J. Goetz et al., 
The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the Eighth Circuit: Protecting the Right to a Free and 
Appropriate Public Education by Advocating for Standards-Based IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 503, 514 
(2011) (arguing that some circuits’ adoption of the “meaningful benefit” standard is evidence of a 
substantive “evolution” from Rowley).
84 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1340 
(10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
85 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). For discussion 
of the Court’s recently delivered opinion, see the Afterword.
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should be taken to satisfy it.86 The alternative “meaningful benefit” standard, 
while ostensibly signaling a more robust commitment, has proven similarly 
difficult to apply. Indeed, the vagueness of each has led some to collapse 
them together.87 For others, the standards retain a clear-enough difference, 
but the ongoing conflict between them is its own cause for lament, increasing 
uncertainty and producing horizontal inequity for similarly situated students 
across different jurisdictions.88
Academic commentators have similarly struggled with the question, 
many simply embracing one or the other side of the circuit split, but with 
little guidance on how to make either standard more determinate, much less 
principled.89 Others, despairing of any substantive resolution, have turned 
their attention to improving procedural mechanisms.90
                                                                                                                         
86 See Cope-Kasten, supra note 64, at 522–38 (commenting that the Rowley decision “sets a pretty 
low bar” and that the courts “do not produce good outcomes for students because of the low standard set 
by the Rowley decision”); Valentino, supra note 78, at 154–55 (arguing that the “some educational 
benefit” standard is no longer viable); see also references cited in supra notes 78, 82–83 (arguing against 
the Rowley “some benefit” standard).
87 See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
88 See Aron, supra note 64, at 6, 25 (noting the “definitional difference [which] has led to divergent 
results for students in different parts of the country” and, further, to district courts and state hearing 
officers “struggling with the existing circuit split”); Goldschmidt, supra note 64, at 752 (stating that a
clear definition is necessary to resolve the current issue of students receiving “different levels of 
education depending on where they live in the United States”); Johnson, supra note 64, at 25 (arguing 
the circuit split must be resolved because “application of these different standards has produced vastly 
different results for students with disabilities”).
89 Compare Johnson, supra note 64, at 31 (advocating “meaningful” benefit as moving a child 
toward self-sufficiency and thus a case-specific inquiry gauged in relation to a child’s potential), and
Goetz et al., supra note 83, at 514 (rejecting notion that what is an appropriate education can be reduced 
to a single standard; instead, IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable a child to receive meaningful 
educational benefits in light of her or his potential), with Gary L. Monserud, The Quest for a Meaningful 
Mandate for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 675, 832 
(2004) (interpreting meaningful to mean “effective results” and “demonstrable improvement” as a 
working standard). See also references cited in supra note 61 (criticizing the lack of substance to the 
standard).
90 See Perry A. Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley:
Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REV. 466, 469–70 (1983) (“[T]he bewildering variation 
among the handicapped . . . def[ies] a single substantive standard and require[s] instead experimentation, 
variation, and evolution of a multifactor concept of appropriateness.”); Jon Romberg, The Means Justify 
the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 415, 466 (2011) (calling 
for better “collaboration, individualization and contractualization” in IEPs); Anne E. Johnson, Note, 
Evening the Playing Field: Tailoring the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at IDEA Due Process 
Hearings to Balance Children’s Rights and Schools’ Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 591, 615–16 (2005);
Michele L. Beatty, Not a Bad IDEA: The Increasing Need to Clarify Free Appropriate Public Education 
Provisions Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 46 SUFFOLK L. REV. 529 (2013) 
(arguing that some interpretations of the FAPE, namely the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Doe ex rel. Doe 
v. Todd county School District, 625 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 2010) violates procedural due process rights); 
Cope-Kasten, supra note 64, at 502, 538 (arguing that “due process is not a fair mechanism for special 
education dispute resolution”).
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Why has the issue of adequate benefits proved so intractable? The most 
elemental difficulty is as easy to state as it is to overlook: it is simply unclear 
what our guiding aim here is (or should be). Quite apart, that is, from the 
fact that the language used in formulating the standards is vague, what is 
also, and more importantly, left unclear is the underlying aspiration: by what 
yardstick are we to assess when benefits suffice to be “some,” rather than 
“too little” or “too much”? What is our goal? And, in pursuing it, what 
competing concerns do we face? Similarly, for “meaningful”: what makes 
benefits “meaningful” rather than merely “some,” and at what point do they 
pass into the impermissibly “maximal”? Again, what are our underlying 
criteria for meaningfulness, and what competing concerns, if any, do we face 
in achieving it?
Ostensibly, our aim might be to secure “equality of opportunity” for
students with disability, a notion finding some support in the language of 
both the statute and case law.91 But as we shall see momentarily, that norm 
provides little guidance when our task is not to remove illegitimate barriers 
to procedural fairness, but rather to adjudicate between similarly legitimate 
claims in the affirmative provision of resources, for the sake of ensuring all 
are fairly given effective access to a substantive benefit. 
And therein lies the nub of the problem. The question posed by adequate 
benefits is fundamentally a distributive one: What distribution of educational 
resources will fairly provide students with disability effective access to 
educational development, taking into account the similarly legitimate, 
competing uses of such resources for the educational development of others? 
Yet forthright recognition of the distributive character of the issue (i.e., of 
the need to weigh the claims of students with disability on educational 
resources against the similarly legitimate claims of other students) has been 
conspicuously absent in the discussions of courts and commentators.92
Indeed, judicial evaluations of the adequacy of IEP benefits routinely 
                                                                                                                         
91 As reviewed infra Part I.B.2.
92 For an important exception, and criticism of the general lacuna in this regard, see MARK KELMAN 
& GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 6–9, 14–15, 199ff (1997). For one of few sources that mention 
the distributive character of the issue, and even then only in passing, see Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board 
of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & ED. 235 
(1983) (“The obvious rationale for the [Rowley] Court’s blatant disregard of Congressional intent was its 
unspoken fear that a contrary result would have opened the floodgates . . . [and] place[d] overwhelming 
constraints on the states’ ability to provide educational services to all children . . . .”). Other observers 
mentioning the issue of cost do so one-sidedly, focusing solely on the effectiveness of different programs 
for students with disabilities, without regard to the distributive effects on other students. See Tara L. Eyer, 
Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic Floor of Opportunity for 
Children with Disabilities, 126 EDUC. L. REP 1, 9 (1998) (focusing on the Supreme Court’s language that 
“it would do no good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to public education 
only to have the child receive no benefit from that education”). Finally, for a discussion of quite distinct 
distributive issues in this context, see Daniela Caruso, Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement and Legal 
Change, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 519–21 (2010) (emphasizing cost barriers facing families of students 
with disability in pursuing claims under the IDEA).
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proceed without so much as a mention of the social opportunity costs 
involved in securing students with disability access to additional educational 
benefits, in terms of the potential educational benefits for other students 
from the same resources.93
Despite this official silence—indeed, partly because of it—the 
distributive character of the issue clearly lies at the heart of the trouble facing 
existing legal approaches. Concerns over costs are the omnipresent backdrop 
against which Rowley and its progeny have struggled to articulate an 
appropriate standard. They are most obviously present in decisions hewing 
closely to the “some” benefits pole, underlying these courts’ reluctance to 
stray too far from a purely procedural vein, and into the terrain of substantive 
gains. But they can also be glimpsed in the emphasis placed by “meaningful” 
courts on not cutting off benefits too quickly for students with high 
potential—these being the students most apt to reap significant gains at 
relatively low cost. Yet remaining unacknowledged, such cost concerns 
inform courts’ decisions inchoately at best, with no explicit reflection on any 
guiding principles to assist in their satisfactory resolution. Moreover, even 
if they were to be made explicit, courts would remain ill equipped to address 
such concerns so long as they continued to view them solely through the 
prism of equality of opportunity. 
2. Educational Opportunity: From Nondiscrimination to Equitable 
Access
Equality of opportunity, framed against a backdrop of 
nondiscrimination, has long been the predominant lens in coming to grips 
with the IDEA.94 In one respect this is understandable. The IDEA may be 
                                                                                                                         
93 For a few of the overwhelming majority of judicial opinions evaluating the adequacy of IEP 
benefits by focusing solely on the student with the disability, see J.L. v. Mercer Island School Dist.,
592 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (analyzing, in isolation, whether failure to specify the minutes per 
week of individualized education violated the student’s IEP); C.B. ex rel. BB v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
636 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the IEP revolves around the “individualized” educational 
needs of handicapped child alone); Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769, 773 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(setting out the responsibilities of IEP Teams for providing services to students with disabilities without 
any mention of needing to attend to the opportunity costs involved); D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ.,
602 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the IEP is comprised of a student’s abilities, goals for 
improvement, and services needed to meet these goals, taken in isolation).
94 See Umpstead, A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 78, at 4–5 (“Varying conceptions of equal 
educational opportunity have driven the debate over the provision of educational services to 
disadvantaged students since the common school movement.”); Valentino, supra note 78, at 157 
(“[C]hildren with disabilities [should] be afforded the same opportunities” to learn as nondisabled 
children); Daniel & Meinhardt, supra note 82, at 515, 521–22, 524 (analyzing various interpretations of 
FAPE standards against the “equal opportunity” language of the state constitutions); Goldschmidt, supra
note 64, at 774 (concluding that IDEA amendments were Congress’ attempt to ensure “equal educational 
opportunity designed to realize [students’] full academic potential”); Eyer, supra note 92, at 5–6 (tracing 
the role of “equal educational opportunity” pre-Rowley, to the Rowley interpretation, to more recent 
IDEA amendments). 
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seen as part and parcel of a more general scheme of federal disability 
antidiscrimination law, alongside the 1973 Rehabilitation Act (RA)95 and its 
1990 successor The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)96—a scheme 
widely understood to extend to disability the reach of traditional civil-rights 
concerns with combating invidious discrimination.97 Yet, ultimately, the 
lenses of nondiscrimination and equality of opportunity are of limited help 
in the IDEA context—and need supplementing by an analysis of distributive 
equity.98
The central question posed by the issue of adequate benefits is simply 
not well handled by the standard tools of antidiscrimination law. Aiming 
principally to secure similar treatment for similarly situated individuals, 
these tools focus primarily on rooting out illegitimate considerations 
marring procedural fairness. But at issue in the IDEA context is precisely 
that students with disability are not similarly situated, so that formally equal 
treatment—by way of the standard educational plan—fails to accord them 
substantively fair treatment. What is needed, rather, is differential treatment, 
tailored to such students’ special needs, in the form of individualized 
educational plans. Moreover, in determining the adequacy of such plans, our 
principal task is neither: (a) to filter out the (perhaps hidden) role of 
illegitimate considerations—such as illicit beliefs or attitudes concerning 
those with disability;99 nor (b) simply to adjust procedural requirements to 
                                                                                                                         
95 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2013). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2013).
97 See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987) (stating that from the 
language of the statute, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was evidently patterned after Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to “address[] the broader problem of discrimination against the 
handicapped”); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 801 (1999) (characterizing the 
ADA as “seek[ing] to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against disabled individuals in order . . . to 
guarantee those individuals equal opportunity”); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 413, 415 (1991) (describing ADA as “a second-generation civil rights statute that goes 
beyond the ‘naked framework’ of earlier statutes and adds much flesh and refinement to traditional 
nondiscrimination law”); Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1207 (2007) (explaining that “American disability rights proponents . . . pursued 
an antidiscrimination approach modeled after previous civil rights statutes, most notably Title VII” of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
98 Readers already convinced that the distributive character of the problem elucidated in the 
previous section—namely, the need to prioritize among similarly legitimate claims to resources so as to 
fairly provide effective access to the good of educational development—requires for its satisfactory 
resolution an analysis sounding in distributive equity, rather than nondiscrimination or equality of 
opportunity, may wish to proceed directly to Part I.B.3. For important earlier treatments of the 
distributive character of the questions raised by disability accommodation, now in the ADA rather than 
IDEA context, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 227, 230–31 (2000)
(discussing employment accommodation as a distributive question); David A. Weisbach, Toward a New 
Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL. REV. F. 47, 47–50 (2009) (applying welfarist theories 
of distributive justice to the issue of disability accommodation).
99 See infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing “discriminatory disparate impact” 
analysis).
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the special circumstances of “otherwise qualified” individuals with 
disability.100 Rather, it is to weigh, in the provision of resources, the meeting 
of their special needs against the similarly legitimate claims of other students 
for the express purpose of securing for all access to a substantive benefit, 
namely educational development. Traditional antidiscrimination analysis is 
bereft of satisfactory criteria to guide us in this respect.101
This might be thought to overlook the “disparate impact” branch of 
antidiscrimination law, with its focus on impermissible effects rather than 
illegitimate processes.102 But analysis of “discriminatory disparate impact,” 
as it has developed under the RA and ADA, sheds little added light here. 
The central question in such cases is whether, despite there being no facial 
discrimination—so that neutral rules have been applied even-handedly—the 
effects of such formally equal treatment on those with disability are 
nevertheless uneven, and, more to the point, uneven in a way that is 
impermissible, so as to merit redress.103 And in answering this question we 
face a fork in the road: (a) shall we continue to look to “discrimination” as 
our lodestar, so that uneven effects are only impermissibly so when they 
likely reflect some illegitimate consideration, one perhaps slipping past the 
filter of facial discrimination analysis, and thus become permissible when a 
legitimate or “rational” basis for them can be adduced?;104 or (b) should we 
reach beyond such analysis and deem some uneven effects impermissible 
even when they are not “discriminatory” (i.e., when they can be traced 
entirely to legitimate considerations), if in the pursuit of such legitimate 
                                                                                                                         
100 See infra note 98 and 106 and accompanying text (discussing “reasonable accommodation” in 
employment contexts under ADA).
101 At best, the procedural focus of such an analysis will tend to issue in the following limited 
prescriptions: (a) counseling only that tailoring which can be fashioned within the expenditure of 
formally equal resources per student, so as to adapt some pedagogic techniques to special needs, but 
without provision for any supplementary learning aids requiring extra expenditures; or (b) mandating 
only those extra expenditures that can be vindicated on “rational” criteria of educational merit (see infra 
note 104 and accompanying text)—meaning where students with disability stand to reap greater marginal 
improvements in their educational performance than would other students from the same further 
resources. Neither of these has been taken as adequate by the courts, and for good reason: neither one 
satisfies the IDEA’s legislative mandate, as discussed infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text, or 
principled requirements of equitable access, as discussed infra Part II, and especially Part II.B.3.
102 Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate: ‘Meaningful Access’ 
to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447 (2008) (arguing that courts have 
identified two types of discrimination claims for purposes of relief under the RA and ADA:
(1) discriminatory intent and (2) discriminatory disparate impact).
103 Cf. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 290 (1985) (noting that not “all action disparately 
affecting the handicap” is “unjustifiable”).
104 See, e.g., EEOC, Interim Enforcement Guidance on the Application of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 to Disability-Based Distinctions in Employer Provided Health Insurance (1993) 
(holding that disability-based distinctions are allowed as non-discriminatory if a sound “actuarial” 
rationale may be adduced for them); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558–59 
(7th Cir. 1999) (applying EEOC’s “actuarial rationale” test to evaluate insurance company’s disability-
based distinction).
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interests there was nevertheless a failure to factor in the special 
circumstances of those with disability? And if we wish to so broaden our 
concern beyond “discriminatory” to simply “inequitable” disparate impact,
what are the relevant considerations of equity to guide our analysis?
Here, however, the case law has stalled in analogous fashion to IDEA 
jurisprudence. Although courts have signaled a willingness to go beyond 
traditional “discriminatory” analysis—so that simply failing to take into 
account the uneven effects of a program or policy on those with disability 
may qualify for a disparate-impact claim105—they have not provided much 
guidance regarding when such uneven effects suffice or fall short for making 
out a successful claim. Guidance, in other words, on what it would mean to 
attend equitably to the special circumstances of those with disability. Rather, 
in language strikingly resonant of the “some” and “meaningful” standards 
of IDEA jurisprudence, they have fallen back on broadly phrased standards 
of providing (some) “reasonable accommodation” within “manageable 
bounds,” or ensuring “meaningful access” short of making “substantial” or 
“fundamental” modifications to programs and policies.106 And so we circle 
back to the same problems facing IDEA case law: standards not only vague 
in their linguistic phrasing but, more troubling, unmoored in any underlying 
aim to orient the analysis, and lacking, even, a crisp sense of relevant 
considerations.107
To answer what it might mean to attend equitably to the special 
circumstances of those with disability, we need to bear clearly in mind two 
pointers: what is our purpose in a given context and how, in respect of that 
purpose, are persons with disability differentially situated? Only then can we 
know what sort of tailored treatment might be merited. In the IDEA setting, 
our purpose, again, is to secure access to a substantive benefit, the good of 
educational development. Students with disability are differentially situated 
in respect of that purpose because they face, in the language of distributive 
                                                                                                                         
105 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 295–99 (redressing discrimination resulting from “thoughtlessness and 
indifference” as opposed to discriminatory animus or intent); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 
52 (2003) (distinguishing disparate impact and disparate treatment claims). 
106 Choate, 469 U.S. at 299–301; see id. at 299 (determining “which disparate impacts § 504 [of the 
Rehabilitation Act] might make actionable” requires an inquiry into the balancing of “countervailing 
considerations” of ensuring access while staying “within manageable bounds”); see also id. at 301 
(“[A] benefit cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped 
individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable 
accommodations in the grantee’s program or benefit may have to be made.”). Subsequently, of course, 
this language has been codified in numerous statutory requirements—not only under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 
§§12112(b)(5)(A), 12181–12183 (2012), but also laws such as the Fair Housing Act, 
42 U.S.C. §3604—that are applicable to a range of public and private entities, including providers of 
“public accommodations” as well as universities and employers who need, when fashioning their 
eligibility requirements, to make “reasonable accommodation” short of “undue hardship” for “otherwise 
qualified” individuals with disability.
107 A sense, that is, of concretely what sorts of factors or concerns are or are not germane to 
“manageability” of accommodation, “substantiality” of modifications, etc.
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justice, a “conversion deficit”: a deficit in translating a given bundle of 
means (educational resources) into valued ends (educational 
development).108 And, so, formal equality of resources fails to secure them 
substantively fair treatment—treatment that is fair in terms of its 
effects—because it fails to take into account their differential capacity for 
converting such resources into educational benefit. And in deciding how to 
tailor treatment to their differential needs, there is no plausible alternative to 
addressing it head on as a question of distributive equity; as a question, that 
is, of prioritizing among similarly legitimate claims to resources—i.e., the 
special needs of students with disability and the needs of other 
students—for the sake of fairly providing to all effective access to 
educational development.109
Strong support for this view of educational accommodation, as requiring 
substantive equity beyond procedural equality of opportunity, is found in the 
language of the IDEA itself. In contrast to the RA110 and ADA,111 the IDEA 
conspicuously avoids any mention of “discrimination.”112 The Act speaks 
instead of “the right” of persons with disability “to participate in or 
contribute to society.”113 It then underscores that those with disability have, 
however, “unique needs,” which must be “appropriately” met if they are to 
                                                                                                                         
108 See SEN, supra note 6, at 28–29, 33–34 (discussing how disabilities can affect the ability to 
convert resources into results).
109 Some might contend that, even accepting its resource-intensive character, nevertheless such 
tailoring should be seen in terms not “merely” of distributive justice between similarly legitimate claims, 
but, rather, of a more imperative form of corrective justice—to “right the wrongs” of the invidious 
discrimination involved in configuring the built and social-institutional environment in ways that 
disadvantage the disabled. Such an argument would draw on the important insights, discussed below, of 
the “social model” literature on disability, concerning the ways in which departures from the statistical 
mean that we commonly associate with disabilities are not necessarily “disadvantages” but only become 
so in light of the way in which individuals having them interact with their specific architectural and 
institutional environments. See infra notes 206–208 and accompanying text (discussing the social 
model’s conceptions of impairment and disability). However, even accepting the strongest social 
constructivist view of the disadvantages from disability (and, hence, of the sources of the “conversion 
deficit” at issue here), we would still need normative guidance concerning what social configuration of 
architectural and institutional arrangements would be just, either in the past or today. See Weisbach, 
supra note 98, at 48–49 (discussing how the social model’s causal claims do not settle the normative 
question). And even if we wished to approach that question through the lens of corrective justice, as a 
matter of “redressing the wrongs” involved in a discriminatory configuration, to answer what would 
“make things right” or undo the discrimination would ultimately involve some baseline inquiry into what 
would have been the right thing to do in the first place and thus how far an unjust deviation took place 
(whether measured in terms of “impermissible harm” to those with disability or “unjust enrichment” to 
those without). And in settling that question, we would have to turn our mind to a normative evaluation 
of the tradeoffs facing decision makers back then, in terms of the social opportunity costs involved in the 
various alternative courses of action. We would have to, that is, turn again to a distributive-justice 
framework, only now pushed back in time.
110 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
111 42 U.S.C. § 12101–12182 (2012).
112 20 U.S.C. § 1400–1482 (2012).
113 Id. at § 1400(c)(1) (2012). 
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be effectively enabled to so participate and contribute.114 In the specific 
context of educational needs, its aim is to ensure access to “improve[d] 
educational results” seen as an intrinsically valuable, indeed constitutive 
good, for the development of personhood and citizenship.115
Why, then, have courts and commentators—and indeed the IDEA itself 
to some extent116—continued to speak in terms of “equality of opportunity” 
as the guiding ideal, with its procedural overtones and roots in 
nondiscrimination? Part of the answer lies, no doubt, in the pull of equality 
of opportunity as a bulwark against a slide into an undesirable “equality of 
outcome.” However, substantive equity aims at a target distinct from both
procedural fairness and substantive equality.
Equity of access is neither equality of opportunity nor equality of 
outcome, departing from both in two ways. First, as opposed to opportunity
or outcome, its focus is on access to outcomes. Second, as opposed to 
equality of access, it aims to achieve equity or fairness in access.
Regarding the first, access goes, on the one hand, beyond the focus of 
opportunity on redressing procedural defects for the sake of ensuring that 
competitive processes are fair—be it through the removal of illegitimate 
barriers to ensure formal equality or, even, the tailoring of otherwise 
legitimate procedural requirements to those differently situated, to ensure 
truly fair equality of opportunity. Access, by contrast, has its eye trained 
directly on a substantive good, seen as valuable in itself.117 On this view, our 
aim in the IDEA context of formative K–12 education is not only to “level 
the playing field” so as to ensure a truly “fair process” of competition for 
grades, but also to secure each student “fair access” to the good of 
educational development, seen as intrinsically valuable. And to ensure that 
such access is effective rather than merely formal, we need to attend to 
involuntary differences in individual needs and capacities. At the same time, 
and from the other direction, access stops short of a direct focus on 
                                                                                                                         
114 Id. at § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
115 Id. at § 1400(d)(3) (emphasis added).
116 Id. at § 1400(c)(1). It should be noted that, on the other hand, the Act also makes reference to 
the goal of enabling “self-sufficiency,” which, as discussed below at Part II.A.3, is best understood as a 
principle of distributive equity, albeit one facing considerable difficulties. It is also a standard that courts 
have shied away from adopting as a yardstick for the adequacy of benefits. See supra note 45 and 
accompanying text.
117 That is, our aim in the IDEA setting is both to move beyond formal equality, by tailoring 
treatment for differentially-situated persons, and to do so for a substantive purpose, of directly enabling 
access to a good, namely educational development. By contrast, one might seek to move beyond formal 
equality, and tailor treatment for those differently situated, but do so while still retaining a purely 
procedural aim, such as, say, ensuring truly “fair competition” for jobs by reasonably accommodating to 
the special circumstances of “otherwise qualified” individuals, as may be thought to be the case in 
employment settings under the ADA. Although, for the view that even in such settings, accommodation 
requires attending to “distributive considerations,” see Jolls, supra note 98, at 251.
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outcomes, sharing opportunity’s sensitivity to leaving a role for individual 
choice and responsibility in determining end results.118
Second, in the place of equality—whether of a procedural or substantive 
kind—we aspire to equity or fairness. Our aim, to recall, is to correct for the 
insensitivity of formal equality of resources to the conversion deficit facing 
students with disability, so as to ensure them substantively fair access to 
educational development. But does equitably adapting resource provision to 
their conversion deficit mean aiming to eliminate all disparities in access to 
development—so as to prescribe equalized access to outcomes? Not 
necessarily. Whether fair access requires, as a matter of distributive justice, 
equalized access is a key point of contention taken up below. For now, it 
suffices to say that our orienting focus is not on eliminating all disparities in 
access but rather on redressing unjustified or inequitable disparities. Leaving 
open for the moment how disparities may be justified or impugned on 
grounds of distributive equity, here we simply observe that equitable access 
may, but need not, issue in equalized access. 
Equity of access, so conceived, is strongly consonant with the Supreme 
Court’s own hesitations in Rowley concerning the aptness of “equality” 
thinking in this context. Taking merely formal or nondiscriminatory equality 
of opportunity as insufficient, and substantive equality of outcome as too 
demanding, the Court observed that the IDEA’s aspiration may simply be 
“too complex to be captured by the word ‘equal.’”119 Quite so. Lacking, 
however, any conceptual alternative, the Court settled upon the 
unsatisfactory “some benefit” standard, as an ad-hoc—unmoored and 
vaguely specified—“midway” between procedural and substantive 
equality.120 But we now have to hand precisely the alternative conceptual 
frame needed—one that requires not only departing from equality, but also 
moving past opportunity versus outcome. Equity of access sites us in the 
right frame: an analysis of distributive priority that reaches beyond all 
procedural concerns to focus directly on effective access to substantive 
benefits, while jettisoning any commitment to equalizing, aiming instead to 
secure fair access to all.
                                                                                                                         
118 As elaborated below, infra notes 137 and 212–214 and accompanying text.
119 See Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 198–99 (1982) (“[F]urnishing handicapped children with only such 
services as are available to non-handicapped children would in all probability fall short of the statutory 
requirement of ‘free appropriate public education;’ to require, on the other hand, the furnishing of every 
special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential is, we think, further than 
Congress intended to go. Thus to speak in terms of ‘equal’ services in one instance give less than what 
is required by the Act and in another instance more. The theme of the Act is ‘free appropriate public 
education,’ a phrase which is too complex to be captured by the word ‘equal’ whether one is speaking of 
opportunities or services.”).
120 Id. at 195, 198, 200. 
2018] EDUCATIONAL ACCOMMODATION AND DISTRIBUTIVE EQUITY 513
3. Distributive Equity within Educational Opportunity
Equitable access in this sense also fits squarely within a distinct meaning 
of “opportunity” in education, over and above one that simply signals
procedural fairness or a desire to steer clear of equality of outcome. In this 
distinct sense, “opportunity” may be taken to indicate a more 
important—higher order or simply more urgent—normative commitment 
than that of general distributive justice. On this view, opportunity points to 
a domain of special goods—such as K–12 education (health is commonly 
thought to be another)—that are taken to be more important than other, more 
generic goods subject “merely” to general distributive justice. Why? 
Because such special goods are thought either to meet especially urgent 
needs or to serve as enabling preconditions for attaining most other goods, 
and as such to be requisites for persons to form a sense of self and take an 
active part in society as citizens and participants in the economy.121
Consequently, straight tradeoffs between these special goods and other 
generic goods are to be curbed.
Within, however, any one domain of such special goods, questions of a 
distributive character will still arise—due, among other reasons, to the 
challenges posed by disability. And to tackle these will still require recourse 
to principles of distributive priority, even if these are now cabined in their 
application, serving to evaluate across competing claims only as they arise
within a delimited domain. Thus, rather than a rejection of distributive 
equity, what issues from this view of “opportunity goods” is instead a 
restriction on its scope: tradeoffs in the provision of resources for enabling 
access to such special goods should take place internally, between the goods 
themselves, rather than externally, against “outside” goods.
Support for such a restriction may also be found in a view based on 
somewhat distinct premises, but having similar implications here. Some 
theorists see goods such as health and education as “incommensurable” with, 
even if not necessarily normatively prior to, other goods. On this view 
education and health—and perhaps other goods as well—go to 
fundamentally distinct components of the good life, each having an 
“irreducible” value—one not sensibly compared to, or directly traded off 
against, others.122 Consequently, distributive principles should only operate 
                                                                                                                         
121 For such a view concerning education, see Christopher Jencks, Whom Must We Treat Equally 
for Educational Opportunity to be Equal, 98 ETHICS 518 (1988). Regarding health, see 
NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 29–63 (2007). For the theoretical 
foundations of both views, see John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 Q. J. ECON. 633, 641–
43 (1974); RAWLS, supra note 9, at 37–38 n.23 and accompanying text, 263–67, 475–76.
122 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 95–103 (1983) (advancing a pluralist, 
“sphere-specific” conception of distributive principles on communitarian grounds, as the best 
interpretation of our historical practices); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2002) (advancing a substantive view of human flourishing, as relevant to 
questions of justice, consisting of ten, irreducibly distinct, “spaces” of valuable states of being and doing). 
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to prioritize or make tradeoffs within, but not across, such distinct 
domains.123
The upshot of these views, for present purposes, is to restrict the focus 
of our distributive analysis to the provision of educational resources for the 
sake of enabling equitable access to the good of educational development.
Our analysis will not, in other words, be one of distributive justice writ 
large—looking to ameliorate various kinds of disadvantage, using various 
means of amelioration, lying inside and outside the sphere of education. 
Rather, it will be an analysis of distributive equity cabined to the domain of 
educational opportunity—aiming to redress disparities in educational 
advantage through the expenditure of educational resources.124
Two more prudential considerations reinforce the case for so cabining 
our analysis. First, doing so hews closely to the IDEA’s stated ambit, which 
is precisely circumscribed to addressing educational disadvantages
associated with disability, through the expenditure of educational
resources.125 The Act targets, that is, only a subset of disabilities—namely, 
“learning disabilities,” those that “adversely affect educational 
performance”—and it uses circumscribed means to ameliorate 
these— namely, the provision of the “special education and related services” 
of an IEP.126 Closely following on from this is a second consideration: 
practical limitations on the capacities of those charged with implementing 
the IDEA, even if its statutory mandate were amenable to a more expansive 
interpretation. As we will see next, the information and resources lying at 
the disposal of those responsible for making priority decisions in real-world 
settings—i.e., local educational authorities (in consultation with parents) 
and the courts reviewing them—are largely restricted to the evaluation and 
                                                                                                                         
For further discussion and references on “incommensurability,” see infra notes 237–242 and 
accompanying text.
123 Allocation decisions across spheres or spaces would need to be made in some other fashion, such 
as, perhaps, through rough political judgments concerning adequate global budgets.
124 It bears clarifying that so cabining our analysis of distributive equity to the domain of education 
does not entail downgrading the significance of distributive justice writ large. In particular, it is important 
to keep in mind that even after the full realization of distributive equity internal to specific domains like 
education and health, there likely will remain a strong case for pursuing “general” distributive justice in 
order to redress residual or overall forms of involuntary disadvantage. For further discussion, see infra 
at notes 230, 247.
125 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1) (2016). 
126 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1) (2016). As we will see below in Part III, 
both the questions of how to measure and evaluate “educational performance” and of when a disability 
may be said to “adversely affect” such performance so as to render it eligible for an IEP, have generated 
great controversy among courts and commentators. And as we will also see there, that controversy is 
most clearly illuminated and resolved using the tools of distributive-justice theory; in particular, analysis 
of the proper index of advantage for distributive concern.
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improvement of educational performance through provision of educational 
resources.127
II. JUSTICE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
A. Existing Standards Recast as Distributive Principles
What, then, is a fair distribution of educational resources—one that 
provides students with disability equitable access to the good of educational 
development, attending simultaneously both to their special needs and to the 
similarly legitimate claims of other students?128 We begin by evaluating, as 
candidate answers, the most prominent existing or proposed legal standards,
now reconstructed as distributive principles.
To ground our discussion, consider the following composite drawn from 
the case law.129 Jamie is a third-grade student with severe dyslexia that 
significantly impairs his reading and writing ability. He otherwise operates 
at a high level of intellectual ability, scoring above average on the 
standardized IQ tests commonly used to measure such ability. At the time 
of the initial evaluation of his disability, Jamie’s test scores in different skills 
and knowledge areas were as follows (the numbers indicate the grade level 
he is performing at): 3.3 for math, 3.1 for general information, 0.8 for 
reading and 1.2 for written language. That is, despite being slightly above 
his own grade-three level for math and general information, he is below the 
grade-one level for reading and just above it for writing.
Suppose our options for devising an appropriate IEP are the following: 
(a) supplementing his regular classroom time with remedial small group 
instruction; (b) further adapting his learning materials and tests into 
multisensory format; (c) taking the multisensory modifications to the next 
level with a specialized Alphabetic Phonics (AP) program that involves 
more interaction with a specialized AP teacher (that a school may have to 
train or bring in from the outside); and (d) finally, shifting him to a full-time
or majority-time alternative placement outside the regular classroom, where 
                                                                                                                         
127 This is not to say that more centralized administrative decisions could not play a larger role in 
implementing IDEA commitments. See infra note 133. But even for those decision-makers, the 
information and resources at their disposal will plausibly remain tied to the improvement of educational 
outcomes through educational resources. 
128 This way of posing the question limits consideration of available resources to those lying within 
the domain of education, and it also limits consideration of the possible uses of educational resources to 
the purpose of improving student access to educational development as the relevant metric of the good 
(or index of advantage) for purposes of distributive concern. The reasons for so cabining tradeoffs are 
given immediately above, in Part I.B.3. Refinements to “overall educational development” as our index 
of advantage are considered below, in Part III.C.
129 D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2010); C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis Minn., 636 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2011); Hall v. Vance City Bd. of Educ.,
774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 
(3d Cir. 1999); Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Joyce, 200 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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he would receive a slower, more methodical and highly structured approach 
to learning as his normal course of instruction. 
Naturally, within each option there exists a range of variation—there can 
be more or less supplemental instruction, adaptation of materials, exposure 
to AP, or even time spent in an alternative instructional environment.
Nevertheless, the basic point is clear enough: each successive option along 
the spectrum involves a more extensive use of educational resources, while 
also holding out the promise of greater educational progress for Jamie; at 
least in terms of reading and writing, but also perhaps more generally if, as 
may often be the case, improvements in one area catalyze those in others.130
Suppose further that Table 1 contains reasonable estimates of the extent 
of annual progress held out by each option in its standard guise. Such figures 
may be available before we decide on which IEP to adopt, as estimates of 
the benefits different plans are “reasonably calculated” to hold out. Or they 
may only emerge after the fact, as different IEPs are tried out in the search 
for determining which is adequate.131 Naturally, the specific numbers given 
here are simplifications, offered for illustrative purposes only. But similar 
figures are typically used by both schools and courts in assessing the 
adequacy of IEPs, and these particular ones are drawn from the case law.132
                                                                                                                         
130 Such spillovers can take a more straightforward form, whereby, for instance, enhanced reading 
ability directly improves learning in other areas (such as “general information”). Or they may operate 
more diffusely, such as by increasing Jamie’s overall confidence and enthusiasm for learning and 
participating in school-related activities more generally. Cf. Hall, 774 F.2d at 630–33 (describing how a 
lack of progress in reading ability resulted in a student with dyslexia “develop[ing] significant emotional 
difficulties because of his failures,” including a “‘school phobia’ characterized by frequent absences” 
and a general “restricting [of] his activities”).
131 IEPs are often retrospectively deemed appropriate and eligible for public reimbursement, even 
when the parents have sought out the plan on their own initiative. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t 
of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (holding that a federal court’s authority to grant “appropriate” relief 
under IDEA §1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) includes “the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for 
their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such 
placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act”); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A,
557 U.S. 230, 244 n.11 (2009) (clarifying that Burlington applies to extend IDEA statutory authority to 
“hearing officers as well as courts to award reimbursement notwithstanding the provision’s silence with 
regard to hearing officers”).
132 See supra note 129 (citing cases used to form a composite on which the discussion is based).
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Table 1: Annual Progress Under Different Plans
Initial 
Level
No IEP Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D
Reading 
&
Writing
1.0 0 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.0
All 
Other 
Areas
3.2 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
Thus, it is supposed that Jamie would make no progress in reading and 
writing without an individualized program, while the extent of his progress 
with a program depends significantly on the specific IEP chosen. Plan C, for 
instance, enables twice the progress of Plan B, but still falls short of enabling 
an improvement of a full grade level per year. For that, we would need 
Plan D, which enables Jamie to make roughly average annual 
progress—remaining at a lower overall capacity compared to others, but 
perhaps not widening the gap. In all other learning areas, it is supposed that 
Jamie would still need at least a minimal individualized program to make 
average annual progress. 
Which plan—or modification or combination of them—is or ought to be 
required under the IDEA?133 A number of alternative answers to this 
question have been advanced over the years. Some of these may be seen as 
simply specifying with greater precision the “some” or “meaningful” 
standards, in order to provide more determinate guidance. Others may be 
seen more plausibly as substitute standards. The main candidates contend 
that an IEP should enable students with disabilities to realize one of the 
following: (a) “equal results” with other students; (b) their “maximum 
potential”; (c) a “minimal level” of achievement; (d) the “same progress” as 
other students; or (e) “efficient progress.” We take up each of these in turn, 
evaluating their appeal and drawbacks. In the course of doing so, we will 
                                                                                                                         
133 Posing the question this way may seem to imply an institutional preference for case-specific 
implementation of IDEA commitments—by contrast, say, to more administratively coordinated 
approaches such as centralized school finance decisions that compare and evaluate commitments across 
categories of disabilities or students. However, nothing in what follows should be taken to commit to one 
or another view of the best mode of institutionally implementing IDEA commitments. Rather, it is 
engaged in the somewhat prior task of exploring, at the level of normative first principle, what those 
commitments should be—by way of a systematic analysis both of candidate principles of distributive 
equity and of candidate indices of educational advantage to which such principles should apply. It is for 
the sake of grounding that theoretical discussion that we consider here a specific case of the sort routinely 
faced by local educational authorities and the courts. This leaves open, for future work, the equally 
significant task of exploring, at the level of institutional design, how best to implement our normative 
commitments in this area. I thank Jasmine Harris and Aaron Tang for helpful discussion of this issue. 
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also begin to develop an alternative, the principle of “proportionate 
progress,” which we will then consider more fully in the Section following.
1. Equalized Access: Telic Equality
On a first view, the appropriate aim for an IEP is to equalize educational 
results for students with and without disabilities.134 This was the aspiration 
attributed, by the Supreme Court in Rowley, to the district court’s standard 
of providing students with disabilities a “full opportunity” to develop their 
abilities. The higher Court interpreted (and rejected) this as a call for 
achieving “strict” or “absolute” equality in outcomes.135
Equality of outcome is, of course, a notoriously unpopular ideal.136 We
should, however, take care to distinguish between several different 
difficulties it faces. To the extent that it is taken simply to mandate 
equalizing results across students, with great precision and irrespective of 
students’ own efforts and cooperation, it is of course a plainly unattainable 
and unattractive ideal. But few if any intend it that way. Virtually all 
prominent views within distributive justice theory give some role to 
individual responsibility, and thereby focus on securing individuals effective
access to the means for responsibly attaining outcomes, rather than on 
realizing the end outcomes themselves.137 Moreover, a moment’s reflection 
reveals that our focus should be on access to outcomes that are “reasonably 
calculated” to occur, allowing for various imperfections in measurement. 
Thus, a refined statement of the ideal would be to provide students with 
disability educational benefits that are “reasonably calculated” to give them 
“equalized access to outcomes.”
Even so refined, however, the ideal remains unattractive and it is 
important to see that this is so for three distinct reasons. First, the aspiration 
                                                                                                                         
134 See Nicholas C. Burbules & Brian T. Lord, Equity, Equal Opportunity and Education,
4 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 169, 182 (1982) (“[I]t is easy to see why this interpretation is 
appealing. First, its goal is the full equality of outcomes . . . in the case of education, such a view would 
be especially appealing because we value so highly the attainment of education.”); Umpstead, A Tale of 
Two Laws, supra note 78, at 6–7.
135 Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 198–99 (1982).
136 Indeed, its unpopularity is likely what pushes many away from distributive justice altogether, 
and back into equality of opportunity as an alluring “midway” between formal equality and equality of 
outcome. That reaction, however, fails to register two key points made in Part I.B, supra, namely: (a) that 
distributive justice views also focus on a midway between formal equality and equality of outcome, 
namely “equitable access” to effective means; and (b) to the extent that equality of opportunity is 
understood, in the present context, as a distinct norm from that of distributive justice (as opposed to being 
a vaguely specified distributive aspiration itself), it provides limited guidance here given the distributive 
character of the question posed.
137 E.g., Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185
(1981); Amartya Sen, Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL. 4, 169 
(1985); Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989); 
G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989). This point is elaborated 
below, with added references, infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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seems unattainable, at least in many instances of significant or severe 
disability. This is likely so even in the case of Jamie, of a single impairment 
directly affecting a single learning area for an otherwise slightly 
above-average student.138 And it holds true even more strongly for the many 
cases that involve much more severe, and often multiple, impairments with 
impacts on a wider range of learning areas. 
However, the unattainability of the aspiration is only apparent, and 
seeing why reveals the deeper flaws with the ideal. If we wished truly to 
provide access to equal results, we could “level down”: i.e., once the ceiling 
of improvements for students with disabilities has been hit, so that additional 
educational resources would confer upon them no benefit, we could 
nevertheless continue with the program of equalization by reducing the 
educational resources devoted to those without disability, until their levels 
had sufficiently dropped. That is, we could reduce the level of the better off 
even when doing so does nothing to improve the level of the worse off, but 
does bring the two closer, simply for the sake of equalizing.139
Now, of course most proponents of an equalized-access view would stop 
short of counseling such leveling down, and insist that their commitment to 
equality is not unqualified or absolute, so that all things considered the harm 
of reducing benefits for some without corresponding gains for others may 
not be worth the increase in equality. What is important to notice, however, 
is that even where leveling down is rejected in practice, it remains in 
principle a matter of regret for this view that unequal access to outcomes 
ensues (even if that regret is not a sufficient reason for action).140 On an 
alternative view, however, the inequality in access is not, even in principle, 
a matter of regret. While it is regretful that some students are not able to 
achieve a higher level, it is not regretful that other students are able to do so. 
This then points to the deepest flaw with the equalized-access view, 
namely its “telic equality” notion that distributive equality is in itself a goal, 
something valuable for its own sake.141 What is wrong with that view is that 
                                                                                                                         
138 Thus, after three years of education under Plan D, Jamie would still, in grade six, reach just a 
fourth-grade level of reading. Presumably, additional supplements to Plan D could accelerate his progress 
even further, but even so, it is unclear whether any amount of additional benefit would bring him to the 
level of the most advanced readers in his class.
139 See DEREK PARFIT, EQUALITY OR PRIORITY? LINDLEY LECTURE 17–18, 23 (1991) (advancing 
the “Levelling Down Objection” to equalizing).
140 See, e.g., ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 100 (1991) (asserting that although “it would 
obviously be wrong to pursue equality by injuring those who are better endowed” and thus “[p]erfect 
equality of resources [where “resources” include personal “physical or mental powers”] may not always 
be achievable at an acceptable cost . . . it nevertheless remains the ideal”). See generally LARRY TEMKIN,
INEQUALITY 245–82 (1993).
141 The term “telic equality” comes from Derek Parfit, to designate the view that “[i]t is in itself bad 
if some people are worse off than others.” PARFIT, supra note 139, at 4. Parfit criticizes this view 
primarily on the foregoing ground, namely that it is vulnerable to the leveling-down objection. This is 
distinct from the following, deeper-going criticism, that the focus on sameness is fundamentally 
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it conflates a commitment to taking all persons’ lives to matter equally, and 
thus to giving each person equal concern in political morality, with a 
commitment to placing intrinsic value on achieving “sameness” in 
outcomes.142 On an alternative view, the commitment to equal concern is 
best understood as a commitment to enabling each person’s life to go as well 
as is possible and fair. And what is fair is that those who are, through no 
fault of their own, worse off than others be given priority because (and to 
the extent that) they are worse off. This is not for the sake of equalizing, but 
rather because their lower level gives them a more urgent moral claim to 
improvements. And the urgency of that claim is always a comparative 
matter, a question of how much worse off they are than other claimants or 
potential recipients.143 With this change in perspective, differences in access 
to outcomes are not by themselves a matter of regret, nor does leveling down 
hold out any appeal, even prima facie.144 What distributive principle might 
result from this alternative elaboration of the commitment to equal concern? 
We return to this shortly, after reviewing the other major alternatives 
currently available.  
2. Maximized Potential: Maximin/Leximin
A close cousin to equal results, but one shorn of its leveling-down 
implication, is that we should seek not to equalize access to outcomes, but 
                                                                                                                         
misplaced—so that it is no answer simply to address leveling-down concerns by, say, qualifying our 
commitment to telic equality by allowing Pareto improvements (the “leximin” view discussed shortly). 
See infra note 149 (describing “leximin” approach to equalizing outcomes). The deeper point is that this 
commitment itself needs to be jettisoned and replaced by another to fundamentally reorient our 
perspective and change entirely the basis and character of special concern owed to those worse off 
through no fault of their own. See infra Part II.B.1. By contrast, Parfit takes the amended, “leximin,” 
view just canvassed as reconcilable with his argument. PARFIT, supra note 139, at Appendix.
142 To avoid misunderstanding, it bears emphasizing that what is being rejected here is distributive 
equality as intrinsically valuable. Distributive equality may still be instrumentally valuable, due, for 
instance, to the impact of distributive inequality on access to positional goods, relative purchasing power, 
or “relative deprivation” effects. And a commitment to equality in a more abstract (nondistributive) sense, 
of affirming the equal moral worth or dignity of each person, and according each member of the political 
community equal concern, is not in question. Rather, what is being questioned here is whether, in matters 
of distributive justice, equal concern should mean we focus on “sameness” as valuable for its own sake. 
(This also sets to one side the possibility that, for other questions of political morality, such as political 
participation by citizens in democratic decision making, equalization may well be of intrinsic 
importance.)
143 This emphasis on the moral significance of comparative levels—on the significance of some 
persons being worse off than others, rather than simply badly off in some absolute sense—differentiates 
the position being advanced here from that of others who also reject the telic equality commitment to 
distributive equality as valuable in itself. See infra note 161 (differentiating the present view from non-
comparative sufficiency and priority views). 
144 Nor, to anticipate the following position, would we single-mindedly pursue only improvements 
for the worse off, with no regard to what is possible and fair for others. That would only be sensible if 
equalizing were our aim, which it is not even if it were attainable.
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rather to maximize the level of the worst off.145 This is the most common 
interpretation of the Rowley district court’s “full opportunity” standard, with 
“maximizing potential” being the formulation most frequently advanced—
and typically rejected—by the courts as an alternative to the “some” and 
“meaningful” benefit standards.146 Instances of the position include the 
mandate, formerly under Massachusetts’ law and still in force in North 
Carolina, to provide students with disability access to “maximum possible 
development” or “full opportunity” to develop their potential, and Pauley’s 
interpretation of the West Virginia Constitution as requiring that each 
student be developed up “to his or her capacity.”147
What these standards require is that we continue to devote educational 
resources to the needs of students with disability so long as they remain 
worse off than others and have any room for improvement. Once a ceiling 
has been hit, we stop and use any remaining resources to benefit those 
students who are already doing better.148 The appeal of such a “maximin” 
                                                                                                                         
145 See Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J.
1435, 1473 (1986) (describing the “maximum potential” standard as a possible approach to equal 
protection). This may be seen as a particular application of John Rawls’s “difference principle” of 
distributive justice, which endorses only those inequalities that redound to the maximum benefit of the 
worst off. Rawls, supra note 121, at 65. However, Rawls himself cautioned against such particularized 
applications of the principle, restricting it to matters of overall distribution resulting from the “basic 
structure” of society—to counsel maximizing the lifetime expectations in income and wealth of those 
least advantaged in that respect. Moreover, he explicitly ruled out taking those with disabilities as the 
“least advantaged” or “worst off” for purposes of applying “maximin”—understanding the principle to 
be either undersolicitous, by focusing on income/wealth holdings without regard for conversion deficits, 
or, if taking such deficits into account, untenable. The two main attempts to handle disability in the face 
of the gap left by Rawls’s theory are those extending Rawls’s “resource” focus to handle disability, and, 
what Rawls himself pointed to, the capability approach of Sen and Nussbaum. Both are evaluated, infra,
in Part III.B. 
146 See Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding Rowley 
precludes analysis of where the student would have made the most progress so long as the public school 
confers “some educational benefit”); Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Ed., 118 F.3d 996, 1001 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (“States must . . . confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child, but the Act 
does not require the furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s 
potential.”); C.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 636 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(“The statute does not require a school district to maximize a student’s potential or provide the best 
possible education at public expense.”); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 
178 (3rd Cir. 1986) (stating that “[h]owever desirable the goal of maximizing each child’s 
potential, . . . such a goal would be beyond the fiscal capacity of state and local governments” and is not 
required either by the IDEA or Rowley”); Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (“IDEA 
and case law interpreting the statute do not require potential maximizing services. Instead the law requires 
only that the [plan] in place be reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful benefit on the child.”).
147 Supra notes 72, 73, and 75 and accompanying text.
148 Although the judicial formulations are open to alternative readings, this “maximin” 
interpretation does seem the most plausible and apt. One alternative reading is to take the standards to be 
urging that we simply seek to maximize, simultaneously, the potential of all students, with or without 
disability. Given, however, that available educational resources will not suffice to enable all students to 
maximize their potential, this view simply returns us to where we started, in search of priority rules to 
decide between those falling short. Another possible interpretation is that we should focus on maximizing 
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position is that it gives strong, indeed absolute, priority to the needs of those 
students worst off due to disability, but without any attempt to achieve the 
unattainable, or unattractive, equalization of access to outcomes.149
Yet this view still faces a distinct problem: taken strictly, the injunction 
to enable Jamie’s “maximum possible development” means that so long as 
we can achieve any improvement in his capacities through added 
supplements to his educational program, we should continue to do so no 
matter how small the improvements, nor how consuming of educational 
resources the supplements. The concern this raises is clear, especially when 
we consider, again, cases of more severe impairments that impact a wider 
range of learning areas, thereby multiplying the areas of deficit and the 
possible interventions for improvement: some students will have potentially 
“insatiable needs,” presenting a so-called “bottomless pit” problem 
requiring us to devote increasingly large amounts of educational resources 
in pursuit of increasingly small, but still positive, educational gains.150 At 
                                                                                                                         
the potential of students with disability, continuing to do so even if their level surpasses that of other 
students, without regard to the needs or potentials of others. This, then, would not be a “maximin” view, 
but rather one that simply singles out one subset of students, those with disability, for maximization. 
Indeed, this may well be what many courts discussing this standard in the IDEA context have in mind. 
Such an approach, however, would still remain subject to the criticisms adduced in the text against the 
maximin interpretation. And it would also face an additional burden: that of having to justify priority to 
students with disability even when they are doing better than other students—a matter which we turn to 
in Part III. We note in passing here that one important benefit of adopting a distributive-justice lens is 
the sharper analytical purchase it provides, enabling us incisively to distinguish and evaluate the 
alternative substantive positions plausibly lurking within any one formulation of an existing or proposed 
legal standard.
149 Strictly speaking, this is perhaps better understood as a “leximin” rather than “maximin” view. 
Maximin stipulates that departures from equality are only justified when they improve the absolute levels 
of the worst off. See Rebell, supra note 145, at 1473 (describing the “maximum potential” standard). 
Hence, even gains to the second-worst-off, which do not come at the expense of the absolute level of the 
worst off but do increase the relative gap or inequality between the two, would not be justified. In other 
words, maximin retains some leveling-down aspects. Leximin, on the other hand, allows such further 
departures from equality, so long as the absolute level of the worst off is still maximized (i.e., it allows 
Pareto improvements to qualify its commitment to telic equality). PARFIT, supra note 139, at 38. Leximin 
counsels, then, that once the worst off have been maximized, we then move to improve the 
second-worst-off, and so on. What matters here, however, is that both views share the commitment to 
giving absolute priority to the worst off, maximizing their level. And for that commitment “maximin” is 
the more familiar moniker, one that also resonates better with the “maximized potential” formulation. In 
any case, the considerations advanced against this view here apply equally to maximin and leximin 
variants.
150 See Jaime Ahlberg, Educational Justice for Students with Cognitive Disabilities, in EDUCATION:
IDEALS AND PRACTICES 150, 160 (David Schmidtz ed., 2014). Although this is frequently referred to as 
the “bottomless pit” problem, that is somewhat of a misnomer analytically, as well as being an 
unfortunate choice of words. A truly bottomless pit is one in which resources are essentially “thrown 
away,” producing no benefit. Here however, the injunction is not to continue to devote resources to those 
worse off even when it produces no benefit, simply because they are worse off—although such a view 
does seem to have been taken by at least one court. See Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 
875 F.2d 954, 960–61 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding the IDEA does not contain a “prerequisite to being covered 
by the Act, that a handicapped child must demonstrate that he or she will benefit” (internal quotation 
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the limit, a small number of students with very high needs may exhaust a 
school’s budget. And, indeed, such concerns have been expressed by courts 
in jurisdictions governed by the “maximal potential” standard, to restrict 
benefits in the face of what that standard, strictly interpreted, would seem to 
require, although without any principled guidance as to how to do so.151
One might think that this takes too literal a view of “maximum possible 
development,” and that a more sensible reading is to interpret “possible” in 
a looser sense: as pointing to a notion of “plausible” or “feasible” maximal 
development, one requiring some judgment of what is practical or 
reasonable. Perhaps. Indeed, we will soon consider one such “reasonable” 
reinterpretation of the standard.152 But what bears underlining here is that 
any such alternative interpretation would need to identify what further 
considerations are relevant to such judgments of reasonableness. And the 
premises underlying the “maximin” approach are bereft of any such 
additional criteria. By giving absolute priority to the worst off, it directs us 
to focus solely on their levels, as the only relevant consideration. This, in 
turn, is only plausibly anchored in the same normative orientation as the 
equal-results view, namely the telic equality aspiration toward equalizing 
outcomes, although now advanced in more muted form. The result remains 
a single-minded focus on improvements for the worse off, with no regard to 
what is possible and fair for others. The view discloses, in other words, no 
other values relevant to determining when to stop short of maximin, nor is it 
clear how any values brought in “from the outside” might be weighed 
against its valuation of equalizing access to outcomes.
                                                                                                                         
marks omitted)). Rather, the injunction is to continue so long as there is some, no matter how miniscule, 
positive gain. A more apt alternative characterization of the issue, offered by Mark Stein, is that of 
“insatiable needs.” Mark Stein, Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique, 50 B.C. L. REV. 489, 500 (2009). To 
this should be appended “potentially” insatiable needs, to underline the point that, in principle, there may 
be a limit or ceiling on such needs, even if it is unlikely to be reached in practice.
151 See Harrell v. Wilson Cty. Sch., 293 S.E.2d 687, 688, 691 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a 
school need not reimburse funding to cover the cost of sending a hearing impaired student to “one of the 
leading institutions in the world which teach deaf students” even under North Carolina’s “full potential” 
standard, which, “as progressive as it may be, was not designed to require the development of a 
utopian-educational program for handicapped students any more than the public schools are required to 
provide utopian educational programs for non-handicapped students”).
152 See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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3. Minimum Achievement: The Sufficiency View
In the face of these difficulties confronting equalization views, many 
may be drawn to an altogether distinct notion of what it means to give each 
person equal concern: what matters is not equality, but sufficiency, so that 
our aim should be simply to ensure that each student is enabled to reach a 
decent basic threshold level of achievement, irrespective of what level others 
are able to reach. What matters, on this view, is that each student has access 
to enough, not to the same.153
The nub, of course, is stipulating what should count as enough, in terms 
of a decent threshold level of sufficient educational attainment. Among the 
array of possible answers, the main options in this camp may be grouped 
into two clusters: those settling on a more minimalist view, such as the 
federal court decisions interpreting Rowley’s “some” benefit standard as 
being satisfied by provision of some non-trivial benefit (most commonly, 
enabling grade advancement),154 and those adopting a more robust
conception, such as those state courts interpreting their constitutions to 
require that each student be equipped to realize a high degree of competence 
across a range of dimensions deemed necessary for active participation in 
social, economic, and political life.155 The central difficulty facing this 
approach is plainly stated: any truly decent threshold will likely be too high 
to be reached by many students with significant disability (or reachable only 
at exorbitant cost), while any broadly attainable level will likely be too low 
to satisfy us that, upon meeting it, we need show no further special concern 
for those with disability. A robust sufficiency standard, in other words, will 
tend to be over-inclusive, while a minimalist one will tend to be
under-inclusive.156
To illustrate, if we use grade advancement as our cut-off, then Jamie 
may only merit Plan A, depending on the extent to which his scores in other 
areas are able to compensate for the low ones in reading, enabling him to 
attain a passing grade overall. To be sure, low reading ability might also 
affect his performance in other dimensions, in which case the requirement 
                                                                                                                         
153 See Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 21–22 (1987) (advancing the 
“sufficiency view” that “[w]ith respect to the distribution of economic assets, what is important from the 
point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If 
everyone had enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others”); 
Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 288–89 (1999). See also references 
cited in note 249, infra (discussing sufficiency approaches to educational equity).
154 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
156 A similar assessment was offered by the Supreme Court in Rowley with respect to one possible 
threshold level, “self-sufficiency”: “Because many mildly handicapped children will achieve
self-sufficiency without state assistance while personal independence for the severely handicapped may 
be an unreachable goal, ‘self-sufficiency’ as a substantive standard is at once an inadequate and an overly 
demanding requirement.” Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 200 n.23 (1982).
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of grade advancement may have some bite. But even so, supposing that this 
means Jamie now merits Plan B, should we really be satisfied when a 
dyslexic student performing above average in other areas has, by grade five,
reached a reading and writing level that remains below that of a second
grader (1.8)? Or that at this rate by grade twelve his reading will hover in 
the range between that of a fourth or fifth grader (4.6)? Does it not matter 
what his potential is for further improvement under Plans C and D?157
Perhaps the problem lies, however, not with the minimum-achievement 
approach but its application to the wrong zone of achievement. What if, that 
is, instead of looking to overall grades/educational achievement in setting 
the sufficiency threshold, we restricted our focus to those specific areas that 
are impaired by the disability, and ensured that each of these reaches a decent 
minimum? What would that decent minimum be here? Under Plan D, 
Jamie’s reading/writing level in grade five will be at just that of a third-
grader (3.0). Does that suffice? If we think not, on the view that a decent 
minimum should be attaining one’s grade level in each distinct area, then we 
have likely transitioned from the problems facing a minimalist view to those 
facing a robust conception. That is, while enabling students to attain their 
grade level across all core areas of skills and knowledge may be a more 
adequate conception of a decent level,158 such a threshold will likely be 
reachable for some students in some areas only at exorbitant cost, if at all.
Now in the case of Jamie, it may turn out to be reasonably reachable, by 
supplementing Plan D with further assistance so as not only to maintain 
steady grade-level progress but also gradually close the overall gap of two 
grade levels. But to determine that, we would need to know what 
considerations are relevant to assessing said reasonableness. And the 
sufficiency approach, like the maximin view, is bereft of any such criteria, 
being an “all-or-nothing” stance: those remaining below the threshold 
continue receive, as with maximin, absolute priority (“all”), while once those 
who can reach the threshold do so, they receive no further special concern 
(“nothing”)—irrespective, in both cases, of the students’ potentials for 
further improvement. Whether or not such restricted absolute priority would 
be concerning in the case of Jamie, it is clear that for any decently robust 
                                                                                                                         
157 Cf. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit, 853 F.2d 171, 185 (3d Cir. 1988) (criticizing 
approaches that evaluate adequacy of benefits under a “single standard” such as grade advancement, and 
calling instead for adequacy to “be gauged in relation to [each] child’s potential”); Ridgewood Bd. of 
Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the same critique explained in 
Polk, 853 F.2d at 185). These passages may be read not only to criticize a “single standard” view for 
ignoring students’ potentials, but also to advocate looking solely to such potentials in determining 
adequacy. However, the two points are distinct, and the latter position, which often devolves into a quasi-
utilitarian view, is critically evaluated infra Part II.B.3.
158 Although it would likely still fall short of the robust citizenship levels held by some state courts 
as constitutionally required. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (outlining eight 
dimensions of learning and skills in which all students must be robustly equipped); see also Lujan v. 
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 n.23 and accompanying text (Colo. 1982) (citing 
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 859).
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threshold there will be some students with severe impairments, raising the 
same “bottomless pit” concerns of potentially insatiable needs as under the 
maximin view. 
The appeal of the sufficiency approach lies in its identification of a 
distinct reason, apart from the aspiration to equalize access, for according 
special concern to students with disability: namely, that such students may 
fall short of achieving what we think is some objectively important threshold 
of educational capacity. The trouble, however, lies both in specifying what 
that threshold is and in the blunt “all-or-nothing” attitude taken toward its 
realization, with its corresponding disregard of any other considerations, 
such as what students’ potentials for improvement may be, below or above 
the threshold. 
B. The Principle of Proportionate Progress
1. A New Fairness Premise
There is an another way forward  from the commitment to equalize,
besides the sufficiency view. And this is to base our special concern for 
students with disability not on their falling short of some objective threshold 
of educational capacity, but rather on their doing comparatively less well 
than others. Priority, on this view, is due to students with disability, not 
because they are badly off according to some absolute yardstick, specified 
independently of how other students might be doing. Rather, it is because, 
and to the extent that, they are worse off than others as a result of their 
disability. And importantly, to recall our earlier discussion, this basis 
remains distinct from any commitment to equalize or give any significance 
to distributive equality as valuable in itself.159 That commitment was 
rejected as embodying a flawed understanding of what it means to give each 
person equal concern, taking it to require a focus on “sameness” as somehow 
intrinsically important, such that it is of value in itself that one person’s life 
go as well as another’s. By contrast, on the present view, our commitment 
to equal concern is better understood as a commitment to enabling each 
person’s life to go as well as is possible and fair. And what is fair is that 
those who are, through no fault of their own, worse off than others be given 
priority—not because we aim to decrease inequality for its own 
sake160—but because gains for a person, or improvements in their life, have 
greater moral significance the lower their overall level is compared to that 
of other potential recipients. Why? Because it speaks directly to the question 
of fairness—of what it is reasonable to ask separate persons, leading distinct 
                                                                                                                         
159 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (critically evaluating the “telic equality” 
commitment).
160 Although we may still wish to do so for various indirect or instrumental reasons, as discussed 
above. See supra note 142.
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lives, to expect from and sacrifice for each other. Although equalizing does 
not hold out any value, nevertheless, when deciding between two potential 
recipients of resources, it is only reasonable that one whose life is already 
going better than another’s understands that improvements for the latter 
matter more—are of greater significance or urgency—precisely because 
they are improvements to a life that is going less well.161
With this change in the normative basis for our concern comes a change 
in the character of that concern: as opposed to giving students with disability 
absolute priority (as under both the maximin and sufficiency principles), the 
priority is now a matter of degree, being a function of how much worse off
such students are relative to others. The shift, that is, in the reason for our 
concern sheds new light in determining the extent of that concern, or how 
much priority is merited: since students with disability are given priority 
because they are worse off, they are to be given priority to the extent that 
                                                                                                                         
161 Further, as discussed next, they matter more not only because of the respective gap in their overall 
levels, but also, correspondingly, to the extent of that gap. This emphasis on the intrinsic moral 
significance of comparative levels—on the significance of some persons being worse off than others, 
rather than simply badly off in some absolute sense—distinguishes the present position from that of
sufficiency and non-comparative priority views that also reject telic equality. See Frankfurt, supra note 
51, at 21–22  (advancing the “sufficiency view” that only absolute levels of wellbeing matter); PARFIT,
supra note 139, at 23 (“On the Priority view, we are concerned only with people’s absolute levels.”); id.
at 25 (putting forward the non-comparative priority view as a “more general version” of the “sufficiency 
view” on which there is greater moral concern for benefiting people when “these people are at a lower 
absolute level,” and not because “these people are worse off than others”). 
The view being advanced here, then, carves out a distinct position in conceptual space from the 
rival views widely thought to exhaust our options in distributive premises, namely: (a) the telic equality 
view that equalizing is in itself of value, making relative levels matter; or (b) sufficiency and non-
comparative priority views that equalizing is not valuable in itself, and so what matters are absolute not 
relative levels. It does so by arguing that (c) relative levels do intrinsically matter, pace sufficiency and 
non-comparative priority, but not, pace telic equality, because we should care about equalizing per se in 
matters of distribution. Rather, it is because even though there is no value to equalizing in itself (pace 
telic equality), distributive equity remains irreducibly relational (pace non-comparative views), since 
gains for one are at the expense of sacrifices by another and comparative levels of wellbeing directly 
speak to the fairness of such sacrifices, to what is reasonable for persons to expect from each other. 
A representative statement of the standard view that our options are exhausted by the choice 
between telic equality and non-comparative views is the following: “Prioritarians are concerned with the 
absolute position of the worse off. A concern for equality, on the other hand, is concerned with people’s 
position relative to others in some respect and that they be equal in that respect.” Dan Brock, Ethical 
Issues in Applying Quantitative Models for Setting Priorities in Prevention, in ETHICS, PREVENTION AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH (Angus Dawson & Marcel Verweij eds., 2007); see also G.A. COHEN, ON THE 
CURRENCY OF EGALITARIAN JUSTICE AND OTHER ESSAYS 69–72 (Michael Ostuka ed., 2011)
(“egalitarians think inequality is intrinsically bad or wrong, and prioritarians do not”; the latter are 
concerned only with “priority to the worst off,” making “comparativity strictly irrelevant” such that 
“distributive patterns are of no intrinsic interest” (emphasis in original)). See generally Marc Fleurbaey, 
Equality Versus Priority: How Relevant Is the Distinction?, 31 ECON. & PHIL. 203 (2015) (framing the 
debate at the level of normative first principles as between telic equality and non-comparative priority 
views, even while querying its policy relevance); Daniel Hausman, Equality Versus Priority: 
A Misleading Distinction, 31 ECON & PHIL. 228 (2015) (same).
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they are worse off.162 They are to be given, in other words, comparative 
priority: their claims on educational resources are greater the worse off they 
are compared to other potential student recipients.
This, then, is the principle of proportionate progress. Students with 
disability should have priority in access to educational resources so long as:
(a) the progress these resources would enable them to realize would, as a 
proportion of their existing levels of development, be greater than or equal 
to (b) the progress such resources would enable alternative recipients to 
realize, as a proportion of their existing levels of development.
Under the principle, that is, those who are at comparatively lower levels 
are given greater priority, which priority is applied to respective potentials 
for improvement. Where the two factors, of comparative priority and 
potentials, converge, the recipient is given especially strong priority.163
The principle directs us, to reiterate, to give priority to students with 
disability not for the sake of equalizing, nor simply because they are badly 
off in some non-comparative sense, but because, and to the extent that, they 
are comparatively worse off. So long as a student remains at a lower level of 
development than others, their gains continue to receive priority. At the same 
time, however, the extent of the priority is a function of how much worse off 
they are, and so, being a comparative matter, it is a relative, not absolute, 
priority.    
What would this principle mean in the case of Jamie? In determining 
which plan is merited, it calls on us to compare two sets of relations. First, 
by how much would each plan reasonably be calculated to improve Jamie’s 
educational progress over his existing level? Second, how much educational 
progress would the same resources reasonably be calculated to secure for an 
average student without dyslexia, as a proportion of her or his level? For 
each contemplated IEP (i.e., Plans A through D), in other words, we ask 
whether the further proportionate progress it would enable Jamie to realize 
is at least equal to the proportionate progress that would be realized by an 
average student were the additional resources required for that IEP devoted 
to them. Before receiving any special educational assistance, Jamie’s 
reading and writing is at one-third the level of his peers on average (he is at 
a grade-one level in grade three). Plan D, to take an example, would enable 
Jamie to improve his reading and writing by a full grade level, a 100 percent
                                                                                                                         
162 By contrast, if the reason for our concern is the aspiration to equalize, then the extent of that 
concern or priority either remains unclear or, as under the maximin/leximin principles, is absolute. 
Similarly for sufficiency views: if the reason for concern is that some are below an objective threshold, 
then the extent of that concern or priority will tend either to be absolute (until they are brought up to the 
threshold), or to remain unclear. 
163 As may be the case, for instance, with early-stage accommodations like hearing aids, braille 
modifications, and the like, that enable students with disabilities to make major gains in significant 
dimensions of learning by addressing large, very salient barriers at comparatively low cost.
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increase in the first year.164 So long as its costs were not so high as to tie up 
resources that would otherwise enable an average student to double her or 
his level (moving up three grades), it would be merited.165
As we move forward under such an IEP, the gap between Jamie’s overall 
level and those of others will hopefully diminish, and so, correspondingly, 
would the priority given to his further improvements. To be clear, so long as 
Jamie’s level remained below that of the average non-dyslexic student, gains 
to him would continue to receive priority. Nevertheless, for that priority to 
justify further accommodations, his additional improvements would also 
need to be substantial enough: if his further progress from additional 
accommodation decreases to the point of him realizing a smaller 
proportional improvement over his level relative to the progress that an 
average student would realize over her or his level from the same resources, 
then we stop short of that further accommodation.166
In three fundamental respects, then, the proportionate progress view 
differs from “equalized outcomes,” “maximized potential” and “minimal 
achievement” positions. First, its basis for giving priority to students with 
disability lies solely in their being worse off than others, rather than for the 
sake of equalizing or because they are simply badly off in some non-
comparative sense. Correspondingly, and second, this priority is not absolute 
but relative, in accordance with how much worse off such students are 
compared to other potential recipients. Finally, flowing out of this form of 
comparative priority is consideration of an additional factor that the other 
views do not take into account, namely students’ comparative potential for 
progress, or their marginal improvements relative to other students.
Accordingly, the proportionate progress approach resolves the 
bottomless-pit problem confronting these other views: students with severe 
disability are given strong priority, reflecting the extent that their 
impairment reduces their level of educational capacity below that of other 
students, but that priority results in further accommodations only to the 
extent that such students’ ability to reap gains, or realize progress, remains 
comparatively significant. To be clear, such students will continue to get 
priority even if their progress is modest, but only so long as the gap between 
                                                                                                                         
164 Possible refinements to this metric of comparison are explored infra Part III.
165 To keep the exposition simple, we evaluate Plan D against a baseline of doing nothing. In reality, 
of course, the assessments will be more incrementally fine-grained, involving for instance comparison
of the further proportionate progress enabled for Jamie by Plan D over Plan C, with the proportionate 
progress that would be enabled for an average student by the additional resources required by Plan D 
over C. These real-world complications do not, however, affect the underlying substantive point.
166 For instance, suppose Plan D was implemented at the outset and Jamie continued to improve 
under it by one grade level each year until grade five, bringing him up to a third-grade reading and writing 
level as he enters grade six. At that point, his overall level is now one-half, rather than one-third, of the 
average. Supposing the improvement enabled by Plan D remains constant at one grade level, the costs of 
Plan D must be lower than the resources required to secure an average student a proportionate increase, 
now, of two grade levels (as opposed to three). Continuing in this vein, it may become justified at some 
point in time to shift Jamie to a lower-cost IEP, such as Plan C.
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their modest progress and the more substantial progress of other students 
remains less than the gap between their respective overall levels. 
This view also obviates the inverse problem to that of the bottomless pit, 
namely the under-inclusiveness of those minimalist sufficiency views that, 
in seeking to avoid robust sufficiency’s bottomless pit, over-correct in the 
opposite, but equally rigid, direction. Opposite because they adopt a 
relatively low (rather than robust) threshold; equally rigid because, below 
the threshold, students are again accorded absolute priority, while above it 
they get none. Here, the glaring problem is not with the absolute priority 
accorded to students below the threshold, irrespective of their potentials for 
further progress, but rather the absence of any priority for those above it, 
despite their remaining worse off than other students (and again without any 
regard for their potential). Comparative priority overcomes, in one sweep, 
both sides of this “all-or-nothing” rigidity, and its concomitant defect of 
ignoring comparative potentials.  
2. Why not “Equal Progress”?
That the proportionate progress principle gives consideration not only to 
students’ existing levels of achievement, but also to their potentials for 
further improvement, is one feature that distinguishes it from the foregoing 
alternatives. The way it factors in such potentials for improvement, however, 
is also importantly distinct from other views that also look to improvements. 
One such prominent alternative is the “same progress” or “equal added 
benefits” view.167 Our aim, on this view, should be to ensure that students 
with disability are enabled to realize the same absolute gains or 
improvements, going forward, as other students, regardless of their 
respective starting levels. 
As should be readily apparent, this position will run into its own variant 
of the “bottomless pit” problem facing the maximin and robust sufficiency 
views: although the aim now is to equalize improvements or progress (rather 
than overall results or attainment of a robust threshold), nevertheless for 
many students with severe and/or multiple impairments, enabling them to 
realize the same educational gains as other students going forward will likely 
be prohibitively costly. Moreover, the underlying source of the difficulty is 
the same: although the equal progress view does look to improvements, 
unlike maximin and sufficiency views, it nevertheless fails, like these other 
                                                                                                                         
167 Such a view is advanced by Professors Silvers and Francis in their important effort to rehabilitate 
disability accommodation under the ADA. See Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating 
Alexander v. Choate: ‘Meaningful Access’ to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 447, 453 (2008) (developing an interpretation of “meaningful access” to education, health and 
mobility services under the ADA as requiring programs to provide something roughly akin to equal added 
benefits for persons with and without disability, as an interpretation of “equal opportunities to use”); see 
also Burbules and Lord, supra note 134, at 183 (formulating the “same progress” alternative); Umpstead, 
A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 78, at 6–7 (same). 
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views, to consider potentials for improvement. And it is potentials for 
improvement, i.e., students’ promise of educational gains from a given 
amount of educational resources, that, when compared across students, 
reveal the educational opportunity costs of a given unit of expenditures, and 
thereby provide one set of criteria relevant to determining the reasonableness 
of such expenditures. 
This failure to factor in potentials for improvement also leads the same 
progress view to face its own version of an additional problem: inadequate 
assistance to students who, despite realizing the same absolute 
improvements as others, nevertheless remain worse off than these others 
while still having significant potential for further improvements.168 The 
same progress view, then, is in the odd position of being simultaneously
over- and under-inclusive.169
This stems from the fact that, unique among the alternatives, this view 
is concerned with neither overall levels nor potentials for improvement. 
Rather its focus is on a somewhat arbitrary third factor, added absolute 
improvements, which are then mandated to be equalized. This is a view 
without analogue in distributive justice theory. Indeed, the position seems to 
be somewhat of a makeshift, an attempted “equality of opportunity” 
compromise between formal equality of resources and substantive equality 
of outcomes. More promising, however, than settling upon an arbitrary 
“equal added benefits” as a stand-in for “equal opportunity,” would be to 
reorient our entire focus, and forthrightly aim at ensuring substantive equity 
of access to resources for educational development, and then specify the
considerations of distributional fairness relevant to such equitable access.
3. Why not “Efficient Progress”? 
A final alternative that also looks to improvements, and indeed to 
comparative potentials for improvements, is an “efficient progress” view. 
Here the aim is to maximize, rather than equalize, progress across students. 
A quasi-utilitarian approach, this view counsels departing from formal 
equality of resources in tailoring educational plans for students with 
disability only when the further resources provided such students would 
yield for them greater marginal gains or progress than if the same resources 
were expended on students without disability.170 Thus, for instance, the 
provision of early-stage accommodations such as hearing aids, braille 
modifications and the like, may be justified (even if they are quite costly) on 
a plausible assessment that such accommodations will, by attending to such 
                                                                                                                         
168 This is a variation on the problem facing the minimal sufficiency view that, in response to the 
over-inclusive character of a robust sufficiency standard, swings over to the other, under-inclusive, side 
of the pendulum.
169 By contrast, the sufficiency view has two distinct variants, with the minimalist variant being 
under- and the robust variant being over-inclusive.
170 C.f. MARK STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY: UTILITARIANISM AGAINST
EGALITARIANISM (2006).
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salient barriers, enable students with the affected disabilities to make major 
gains in significant aspects of learning and skills. Additional expenditures 
of similar magnitude on students without disability may well not yield as 
high a set of marginal benefits.
Limiting assistance to such “high yield” interventions, however, would 
fall considerably short of the sort of accommodations that most courts and 
commentators routinely agree are merited.171 The reason? Stopping at that 
point would leave most students with disability still much worse off than 
others across a range of educational dimensions, in a manner that seems 
clearly unsatisfactory. For instance, in our case it is unclear whether even 
the lowest-cost Plan A, of supplemental remedial instruction, would be 
merited since it improves Jamie’s reading only by 0.2 grade levels.172
The underlying problem here is the flaw with the utilitarian approach to 
distributive justice more generally: namely, that it takes an implausibly one-
sided view of equal concern, treating persons equally solely in terms of their
ability to reap added, marginal benefits, with no consideration given to how 
they are faring overall. And what propels this one-sided principle is, 
ultimately, an underlying commitment to maximization for its own sake.173
In, however, the context of separate persons leading distinct lives, such a 
“telic efficiency” commitment to maximization of some aggregate as 
valuable in itself, makes as little sense as the “telic equality” commitment to 
sameness as valuable in itself.174
4. A New View of Fairness
Just as the proportionate progress view departs, then, from equalizing 
and sufficiency approaches on how to evaluate overall levels, so it departs 
from the same and efficient progress views in how to evaluate added 
                                                                                                                         
171 See supra text accompanying notes 129–131 (explaining options for devising an appropriate IEP 
based on a composite of case law).
172 See supra Table 1.
173 RAWLS, supra note 9, at 23.
174 Why? Because it is ultimately premised on a mistaken personification of society, as if there were 
some supra-personal being that experiences the sum of benefits net of costs maximized across persons. 
See id. at 19–24. But actually there are only individual persons, across whose distinct lives the benefits 
and costs are traded off. And in evaluating such tradeoffs, it is highly implausible that we should not care 
about how well or badly, overall, such persons’ distinct lives are going relative to one another. 
Similar to telic equality, the telic efficiency commitment may find more or less qualified expression 
in different distributive principles, each pursuing the commitment to a different extent. In parallel, that 
is, with telic equality giving rise to equalized access, maximin, and leximin principles—with each 
successive principle further muting its pursuit of the underlying commitment so as to take in account 
additional difficulties it faces—so telic efficiency may generate principles of maximizing: (a) a sum total; 
(b) the average; or (c) at the margins. In both cases, however, what is needed is not to qualify the 
commitment with various ad-hoc adjustments to manage each new difficulty as it crops up, but rather to 
jettison it altogether in favor an alternative underlying commitment that better captures our deeper sense 
of what ultimately matters. The import of making that deeper shift is brought out in the following Section.
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improvements. Integrating these dual sets of departures, a new view of 
fairness comes into focus. 
On this view, our commitment at the deepest level of distributive justice 
should be to give priority to those who are worse off through no fault of their 
own because and to the extent that they are worse off. Not because we want 
to equalize, but because it speaks to fairness, to what is reasonable to expect 
separate persons leading distinct lives to expect from and sacrifice for one 
another. Equalizing, for its own sake, is of no value. Similarly implausible
is maximization for its own sake. And while a focus on an absolute threshold 
level of “decency” is initially more plausible, it finally proves untenable as 
well, because what is decent is, ultimately, contextual to what is possible for 
others and hence to what is fair—precisely, that is, to what comparative 
priority directs our attention to.
Effecting such a fundamental shift at the level of our deepest 
commitments generates, on the surface, a principle that provides more 
persuasive prescriptions across the entire range of accommodation cases.
The principle does so because, being rooted in a more compelling 
foundation, it organically—internal to its own commitments—identifies all 
the relevant considerations, and so takes them into account in a 
systematic—that is, comprehensive and consistent—fashion. By contrast to 
each of the alternative principles, which focus one-sidedly on either levels 
or improvements, the principle of proportionate priority automatically gives 
consideration to both. Moreover, it does so in the right way—evaluating 
levels in terms of comparative priority and improvements in terms of 
comparative potentials—so as to integrate the two into an analysis of 
equitable opportunity cost.175 The superiority of the proportionate priority 
view resides, then, not only in the range of considerations it identifies as 
relevant, but also in the way it handles them. And in both respects this owes,
ultimately, to the deeper reason it takes these considerations to matter.
What matters on this view is neither to equalize the overall levels of all 
students, nor to maximize or “sufficientize” the levels of students with 
disability; nor, for that matter, to equalize or maximize improvements across 
                                                                                                                         
175 Rival principles, by contrast, not only fail to take into account all the relevant considerations, 
they also give inapt treatment to the ones they do single out for attention—with both these surface defects 
stemming from deeper flaws, in their underlying commitments. Thus, maximin and sufficiency views 
not only focus single mindedly on overall levels, but also give them absolute priority—thereby not only 
failing to supply any criteria for how to factor in the costs of improvements, but flatly rejecting their 
relevance altogether. Behind both shortcomings is an untenable concern with equality or decency, as 
opposed to fairness as a comparative matter—for the latter, a focus on levels as a matter of comparative 
priority automatically integrates a concern with improvements in terms of comparative potentials. From 
the other direction, efficiency not only disregards levels to focus one sidedly on improvements, but also 
pursues only cost-effective ones at that—this undergirded by its implausible devotion to the pursuit of a 
maximized sum or average as valuable for its own sake, irrespective of fairness across persons. Finally, 
equal progress’s aim of equalizing improvements—irrespective either of levels (or equity as comparative 
priority) or of costs (equity as comparative potential)—stems from its lingering attachment to an 
“equality” midway between formal opportunity and substantive outcomes.
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all students. Rather, it is to ensure that all students have access to meaningful
improvements. And the meaning of improvements is to be understood inter-
subjectively, within and across different students’ educational lives, in terms 
both of how well or badly they are already doing and of how much or little 
they stand to improve. Educational gains are to be understood, that is, in 
terms what they signify for each person in the context of her or his own 
development, compared to what the alternative gains for others would 
signify for them in the context of their development. 
5. How the Principle Makes Sense of Current Law
How does the proportionate progress view square with existing legal 
formulations of the appropriate standard for IDEA benefits? For reasons just 
given, it offers an especially attractive elaboration of the “meaningful” 
standard, spelling out what considerations are relevant to determining 
whether a benefit is “meaningful,” and, correspondingly, identifying 
specific factors to structure the inquiry. In particular, the principle fills in the 
crucial gap facing this standard, namely how to factor in what the standard 
rightly emphasizes as a central consideration: students’ diverse potentials for 
improvement. And it does so by bringing to light, for explicit consideration, 
two further factors that, in its current form, the standard either outright 
misses or implausibly leaves in the shadowy background: the “severity” of 
a disability, in terms of the extent of its impact on a student’s educational 
level,176 and the role of opportunity costs, which are now accounted for in a 
principled way, to equitably discipline our pursuit of the aspiration to enable 
students with disability to realize their full potential. 
In a similar vein, the proportionate progress view also provides a new 
lens with which to revisit a long-standing, and controversial, standard: the 
one originally articulated by the district court in Rowley, that an IEP should 
provide students with disability the “opportunity to achieve [their] full 
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”177
As we have seen, the Supreme Court in Rowley rejected this “full 
opportunity” view, interpreting it as a call for equalization of outcomes.178
Nevertheless, the formulation has proved influential, being adopted by 
Justice White in his dissent in Rowley and continuing to exert a pull on state 
legislatures and courts.179 Its sway is likely due to the promise held out by 
                                                                                                                         
176 Courts often overlook this factor to focus one sidedly on potentials for improvement and thus, 
slide imperceptibly toward an “efficient progress” view.
177 Rowley I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d,
458 U.S. 176 (1982) (emphasis added). 
178 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
179 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.1 (LEXIS through Session Laws 2017-56) (providing that 
“[t]he goal of the State is to provide full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities”); 
Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 215 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Cone ex rel. Cone v. Randolph Cty. Sch., 
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the clause modifying “full opportunity,” a clause often dropped in 
restatements of the standard but one that is clearly crucial to its meaning: 
namely, that such full opportunity for students with disability should be 
“commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”180 The 
promise of this clause lies in its aspiration to take care, in giving priority to 
students with disability, to recognize the legitimate needs of others. 
The proportionate progress view fulfills that promise by interpreting 
“commensurate with others” to mean “taking into account the similarly 
meaningful gains of others.” Any notion of “commensurate” gains involves, 
that is, some sort of inter-subjective measure or assessment of the gains, an 
evaluation of their significance across persons. And proportionate priority 
offers a particularly apt way of undertaking that evaluation, directing us to 
understand the interpersonal significance of students’ respective educational 
gains by embedding them in the comparative context of how each student’s 
educational development is going overall. In doing so, it articulates a notion 
of commensuration as reciprocity: recipients of educational resources are 
asked to compare what the further progress they might realize would signify 
for them, in the context of their own lives, to what the alternative gains for 
others would signify for them, in the context of their lives.181
Finally, the principle also provides, and for similar reasons, an attractive 
elaboration of the “maximum possible development” standard, at least on a 
non-literal reading of it that gestures toward some notion of “plausible” or 
“feasible” maximal development.182 Proportionate progress supplies the 
missing element of such a view, namely criteria for when further educational 
developments for a student, despite being “possible,” cease to be “plausible” 
or “feasible.” What is “plausible” for any one student should be understood 
                                                                                                                         
302 F. Supp. 2d 500, 509–10 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing the North Carolina statute and Justice White’s 
dissenting opinion in Rowley to declare North Carolina’s policy as being to “ensure every child a fair and 
full opportunity to reach his full potential”); Harrell v. Wilson Cty. Sch., 293 S.E.2d 687, 690 (N.C. App. 
1982) (citing the North Carolina statute and Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Rowley to state that “a 
handicapped child should be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with the 
opportunity given other children”).
180 Rowley I, 483 F. Supp. at 534.
181 To prevent misunderstanding, it is of course not being claimed that the construal offered 
here—how to give all students “full opportunity commensurate with others”—is the only plausible 
interpretation of the “full opportunity” standard. Indeed, the standard has typically been construed in 
rather different ways. Thus, on one common interpretation, it is a synonym for the “maximum possible 
development” view in its strict, literal sense. And on another interpretation, it mandates accommodations 
only so long as students with disability are able to reap greater marginal improvements than others. 
Indeed, this latter, quasi-utilitarian view, may well often be the one that courts articulating the standard 
have in mind, given that the cases where it is invoked often involve facts, such as in Rowley, where the 
student with disability does seem to have comparatively greater potential for further marginal gains. The 
claim being made here is that the proportionate priority view is not only reconcilable with the standard 
but also, moreover, that it offers a particularly compelling elaboration of it.
182 See supra text accompanying note 152 (suggesting such a reading as “a more sensible” 
interpretation of the standard). 
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in terms of what is possible for other potential student recipients, and, 
moreover, what is reasonably or fairly possible, meaning that we compare 
not only the students’ respective potential gains, but also the overall levels 
against which such gains are made.183 Such an elaboration dovetails 
precisely with the gloss that some courts have given this standard, namely 
that it be taken to require the maximal development of students with 
disability in light of what is “reasonably possible [or] fair”184—but while 
supplying, what these courts have been reticent to do, the considerations 
relevant to determining when constraints on possible development are 
reasonable or fair. 
What of the “some” benefit standard? Clearly, the proportionate 
progress principle is a move away from it, in the direction of a more robust 
“meaningful,” or even “full” or “maximal” benefits standard, as many have 
urged is both justified in principle as well as required by recent federal 
legislative developments and under the constitutional and statutory law of 
some states.185 Only now, that departure is made in a more principled way, 
one that reinterprets and fleshes out these alternatives in a more determinate 
and persuasive form.  
Moreover, the principle also addresses the concerns that originally 
animated the adoption of the “some” benefit standard to begin with, 
centering on the need to place limits on the extent of accommodation 
required. The Supreme Court’s emphasis in Rowley on the language of equal 
opportunity—of a “basic floor of opportunity”186 or “open . . . door” of 
access rather than “any particular level” of benefits187—and its adoption of 
the amorphous “some” benefit criterion, was undergirded by two central 
worries. The first was an uneasy sense that the only alternative to equality 
of opportunity is a dreaded “equality of outcome.”188 As shown above, 
however, the appropriate theoretical alternative, or supplement, to “equality 
of opportunity” is not “equality of outcome,” but rather “equity of access” 
to educational resources, analyzed in terms of distributive justice.189 And, 
                                                                                                                          
183 As opposed, say, to taking plausible or feasible to mean what is “efficiently possible,” which 
would confer additional resources on a student only when they would yield greater marginal gains than 
for any other student, without any consideration of the students’ respective overall levels. 
184 Burke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  
185 See supra text accompanying notes 82–83 (discussing the commentary around state and federal 
statutes and cases that have advocated or required for states to go beyond the “some benefit” standard in 
Rowley II). 
186 Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 198, 200 (1982). 
187 See id. at 192 (explaining that the intent of the IDEA is “more to open the door of public 
education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of 
education once inside”). 
188 See id. (citation omitted) (explaining that Congress recognized that “providing special  
education . . . is not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome”). 
189 See supra Part I.B. 
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within that frame, virtually no distributive justice position endorses equality 
of outcome. The proportionate progress view, in particular, rejects it on 
multiple grounds.190 A second, related but distinct, concern was that of costs, 
of how to legitimately impose a “ceiling” on expenditures for students with 
disability once we go beyond a “basic floor.”191 Proportionate progress 
shows precisely how to do so, in a disciplined yet principled way, bringing 
to light the competing considerations and weighing them fairly. 
Finally, a third concern appears to animate a number of courts that have 
adopted the “some benefit” standard. Such courts emphasize the “severity” 
of certain disabilities as a reason not only to shy away from more demanding 
standards (even those short of “maximized development,” such as 
“sufficient development”), but also for accepting as adequate only
“minimally” discernable benefits.192 In light of the foregoing analysis, we 
can now see these courts to be, on the one hand, properly highlighting the 
impact that severe disability may have on students’ comparative potential
(that is: if the severity of a disability prevents a student from making much 
progress even at great expense, this is indeed a relevant factor weighing 
against the expenditure). Yet on the other hand these courts should also now 
be seen as having neglected to consider that severity also affects these 
students’ comparative priority (the more severe the disability, the worse off 
the student is, and hence the more urgent our concern). Proportionate 
progress gives both considerations their due.  
                                                                                                                         
190 See supra pp. 34–38 (explaining that even when the ideal is adjusted to factor in individual 
responsibility—thus shifting from equality of outcome to equality of access to outcomes—it remains 
unattractive for three reasons: (1) its equalized access and maximin variants counsel “leveling down,” 
i.e., reducing educational benefits for some without any corresponding gains for others, “simply for the 
sake of equalizing”; (2) its leximin variant, while abstaining from leveling down, remains untenable in 
giving absolute priority to the worst off, irrespective of the costs involved, for which it provides no 
guidance on how to address; and (3) most fundamentally, lying at the root of its difficulties, is its mistaken 
“telic equality” commitment to “distributive equality [as] . . . something valuable for its own sake,” so 
that sameness rather than fairness is taken to be what matters (citations omitted)).
191 See Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) 
(emphasizing resource constraints in holding that the IDEA “does not require a school district either to 
maximize a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense”); Lunceford v. 
D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (rejecting the “best education 
money can buy” view on the grounds that “resources are not infinite, and many other demands compete 
for limited public funds”).
192 See, e.g., Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (1985) (suggesting that 
minimal results are acceptable for the most severely handicapped children). 
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III. EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE & THE SPACES OF DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE
A. Complex Cases
Our discussion until now has focused on what may be considered a core 
or central case: a student with a disability (such as dyslexia) who, on account 
of that disability, is at a lower academic level than the average non-disabled 
student, both in the specific learning area(s) directly affected by the 
disability (such as reading and writing) and in her or his overall academic 
performance (test scores or grades averaged across all subjects). But what if 
a student, despite the disability, nevertheless performs at an average or 
above-average level—either overall or, even, perhaps, in the specific 
domain(s) negatively affected by the disability? Should he or she continue 
to receive priority in the line for educational resources? If so, why and to 
what extent? 
Cases of this sort are not uncommon. Indeed, in Rowley, Amy’s above-
average grades were a major reason why the Court held that she did not merit 
any further accommodation by way of an in-class interpreter.193 Similar 
holdings include: 
x a dyslexic student found ineligible for IDEA benefits on account of
making the honor roll in junior high and high school, since that 
indicated he “was performing . . . on average or above 
average . . . even before the accommodations”;194
x a “very bright” third-grade student with a “non-specific learning 
disability [that] affected his development of reading skills” held not 
to merit special education because, even “without any modifications 
to the curriculum or any specialized instructions,” he was 
“performing above grade level expectations in math and spelling, 
between third and fourth grade levels in reading and at the third 
grade level in writing”;195 and 
x a student with ADHD held ineligible on the grounds that “the 
educational challenges the Student does have are not sufficiently 
affecting her educational performance such as to keep her from 
staying within the range of her peers.”196
                                                                                                                         
193 Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 209–10 (1982).
194 Grant v. Saint James Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV. A.99–3757, 2000 WL 1693632 at *1, *2, *5 
(E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2000) (footnote omitted), aff’d, 273 F.3d 1102 (5th Cir. 2001). 
195 Weston Pub. Sch. Dist., 34 Individuals with Disabilities L. Rep. (Labor Relations Press) ¶ 75, 
at 272–74 (Mass. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals Feb. 2, 2001).
196 Northshore Sch. Dist., 35 Individuals with Disabilities L. Rep. (Labor Relations Press) ¶ 144, 
at 567, 574 (Wash. State Educ. Agency July 18, 2001).
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Decisions like these represent the prevailing view: the “vast majority of 
hearing officers and courts find that above average educational performance 
means special education is not needed.”197
A contrary position has, however, been taken in some cases. These 
include: 
x a student suffering from a “neurological impairment . . . hinder[ing] 
his ability to process auditory information and engage in normal 
language and thinking skills,” held eligible for special education 
despite the fact that, due to having a “full scale IQ of 130,” he 
performed at an overall average to above-average level;198
x a “gifted child with very superior cognitive abilities” who, despite 
performing well academically, was deemed eligible on account of 
having “perceptual deficits” that “impact on educational progress,” 
whereby his “language and cognition skills surpass his [existing, 
perceptual-impaired] performance skills”;199
x a “mentally gifted” student who, despite having overall success in 
regular education, was deemed eligible for special education on 
account of being diagnosed with a “specific learning disability in 
the area of written expression” that resulted in “problems with the 
rate and degree of completion of his written work”;200 and 
x a student with ADD who was denied special education by the school 
district on account of performing average to above-average, but was 
deemed eligible upon judicial review due to his dropping from 
“Level I” to “Level III” courses, with the court holding that 
“entitlement to IDEA services must be gauged in relation to the 
child’s potential,” so that the school district “erred in focusing on 
[his] grades while disregarding his potential.”201
What lies behind these different positions? The majority view, on its 
face, is simply that when a student is above average, her or his disability can 
no longer be said to “adversely affect” her or his “educational performance,” 
as is required for eligibility for special education under the IDEA.202 The 
minority, for its part, takes the view that so long as the disability may be 
discerned to have any detrimental effect on performance, it is eligible for 
                                                                                                                         
197 Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 441, 502 (2004).
198 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Tullahoma City Sch., 9 F.3d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1993).
199 Benjamin R., 508 Educ. of the Handicapped L. Rep. 183, 185 (Mass. State Educ. Agency Aug. 
8, 1986).
200 Conrad Weiser Area Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ. 603 A.2d 701, 702, 705 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
201 W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d 417, 418–19, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
202 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2017) (defining as a “disability” an impairment that “adversely affects a 
child’s educational performance”); Garda, supra note 197 at 502ff (discussing majority position).
540 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2
redress under the IDEA.203 Stated on their own terms, neither position seems 
very satisfactory: the majority view seems premised on a highly implausible 
reading of “adversely affect”—surely a disability may still be said to be a 
drag on performance even where a student is able to rise above it—while the 
minority view seems impossibly demanding—when can the effect of a 
disability ever be shown to have been eliminated or “fully remedied?”
Further, the debate between them lacks traction, starting and ending on rival 
premises concerning the meaning of “adversely,” without any purposive 
criteria offered by which to judge the substantive merits of their competing 
interpretations.
Is there a way beyond the impasse? Yes. When viewed through the lens 
of distributive justice theory, both the majority and minority positions can 
be seen in fact to track, albeit inchoately, distinct positions concerning the 
appropriate “space” or “index” of advantage for distributive concern. 
Reconstructing these positions, then, in terms of their underlying distributive 
premises offers a promising way forward, both for clarifying the substantive 
stakes and for working toward a satisfactory resolution.
The distributive premises underlying the majority position are most 
plausibly reconstructed as follows: The reason students with disability are 
owed special concern is because we suppose that their disability 
disadvantages them, vis-à-vis other, non-disabled, students, in terms of 
educational development. The disability renders them, in other words, 
“worse off” than others in the domain of educational development. When, 
however, that no longer obtains—i.e., when such students are performing at 
an average or higher academic level—then our basis for special concern 
ceases and so, accordingly, should their eligibility for any priority in the 
queue for educational resources.
The minority view, on the other hand, is most plausibly understood as 
embracing a narrower, disability-specific, target space of concern than 
“educational development” writ large. Here, the focus of special concern for 
students with disability is simply the disability itself, as a source of 
disadvantage vis-à-vis otherwise similar students who do not have that 
disability. On this view, then, students with disability should remain eligible 
for priority so long as some hampering effects of the disability remain 
(i.e., so long as the disability’s deficits have not been fully remedied).
How should we decide between these views? Adopting the principle of 
proportionate progress does not by itself conclusively resolve the matter. It 
might seem on first glance that the principle fits better with the majority 
view, given that the principle’s basis for priority is precisely that students 
                                                                                                                         
203 See, e.g., Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 215 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the IDEA 
language that “special education” be “specifically designed . . . to meet the unique needs of a handicapped 
child” should be interpreted as “intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the 
extent . . . reasonably possible”); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 408 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (advocating “disability remediation”). 
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with disability are, as a result of their disability, worse off than the average
non-disabled student in some relevant respect, here overall educational 
development. And so, when students with disability are not, or are no longer, 
worse off than the average in that respect, then, correspondingly, our special 
concern and priority should cease. 
But this simply begs the question: should “overall educational 
development” be the relevant respect in which students with disability are to 
be worse off, or disadvantaged, as to merit special concern and hence be 
eligible for priority? Or should we instead adopt a more fine-grained view 
of the relevant disadvantages associated with disability and, 
correspondingly, continue to deem eligible for priority those with disability 
so long as they remain worse off in these more narrowly-targeted 
dimensions? Taking this latter route, the principle of proportionate progress 
may fit quite well with the minority view.204
The principle of proportionate progress, in other words, is a distributive 
principle, one that may be applied to different target spaces of distributive 
concern. But the debate between the majority and minority views turns not, 
at least in the first instance, on the appropriate principle of distributive equity 
to apply in cases of disadvantage, but rather on what sort of disadvantage is 
the appropriate focus of distributive concern. Their disagreement centers, in 
other words, not on the extent of special concern or priority to be accorded 
those who are worse off, but rather on the relevant respect in which students 
are to be worse off as to be eligible for priority in the first place. And that 
disagreement goes to a second, distinct, debate within distributive justice 
theory from the one that has occupied us thus far.
Lying at the heart of distributive justice theory, that is, are two distinct 
(albeit related) fundamental questions: What space(s) of the good, or 
advantage, should it be our ultimate concern to provide access to as a matter 
of distributive justice? And what principle(s) of distributive equity should 
we apply to our chosen space(s) of concern, to ensure that access is fairly 
provided for all?205 Our focus in this Article has been on the latter. In the 
course of evaluating candidate answers to it in the preceding part, we simply 
assumed—implicitly and provisionally—a particular answer to the question 
regarding the space of concern, namely that “overall educational 
development” was the appropriate index of advantage to which our 
candidate principles were to apply. Shifting, however, from the core to more 
complex cases requires us now to reconsider that provisional answer, and to 
                                                                                                                         
204 Although application of the principle to the minority’s target space would still fall short of 
counseling what the minority position does in its main guise, full “disability remediation.” See infra note 
243 (noting that applying the distributive principle to the minority view counsels continued priority only 
to the degree called for by a student’s disability-specific capacity for improvement compared to that of 
other students). 
205 Or, put another way: what is the appropriate metric of advantage for distribution, and what is 
the appropriate distributive function?
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reflect more explicitly on the question: what kinds of disadvantage should it 
be our concern to redress in the context of expending educational resources?
B. Disability and the Spaces of Distributive Justice
That question ultimately resolves, as we shall soon see (in Section C
below), into two sub-parts: (a) how should we measure and compare 
particular dimensions of educational progress or development; and (b) what 
barriers to educational progress should we seek to ameliorate? And lying at
the back of each of these is a farther-reaching, more abstract query: (a) what 
is the appropriate index of advantage for distributive justice; and (b) which 
sources of disadvantage are eligible for distributive redress? Since the 
considerations relevant to answering these have been forged in the course of 
more general debates on distributive justice and disability, a brief distillation 
of those general debates is in order before turning to the questions as they 
are specifically posed in the educational context.
Disability is best conceived in terms of a three-way relationship, 
between: (a) individuals’ physical and mental constitution; (b) their natural, 
built and institutional environment; and (c) social policy.206 An impairment,
on this view, is any significant “loss of”207—or, perhaps better, simply 
“departure from”—“normal” or “species-typical” mental or physical 
functioning.208 Such impairment becomes a disability when, through the 
course of a person’s interaction with his or her architectural and institutional 
environment, the departure translates into a disadvantage vis-à-vis those 
                                                                                                                         
206 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES 
MEMBERSHIP 423–24 (2006) (drawing on disability literature to distill a conceptualization broadly along 
these lines); SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 18–20, 34 (2009) (adumbrating the social model).
207 NUSSBAUM, supra note 206, at 423 n.5.
208 To speak of disability in terms of a “departure from”—rather than a “loss of”—typical 
functioning is to register the insights of the social model of disability, concerning the potentially 
naturalizing and stigmatizing ways in which certain deviations from statistical averages and social norms 
are characterized. See, e.g., BAGENSTOS, supra note 206, at 18–19 (“Where disability is treated as a 
medical condition or functional deficit, it is readily seen as a ‘personal tragedy’ . . . . [T]he view of 
disability as a personal tragedy obscures the social practices that exclude ‘the disabled’ from the 
opportunity to participate fully in society.”); MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT:
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (1990); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 
86 VA. L. REV. 397, 436 (2000) (“[S]ocial practices that attach systematic disadvantage to particular 
impairments are what create the category of people with disabilities.”) (emphasis in original); 
Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 633 (1999) (“[S]tereotypes 
about disability may be as much a barrier to individuals with disabilities as the impairments 
themselves.”); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 599 (2004) (contrasting the social and medical models of 
disability). The language of “normal” functioning is used in NUSSBAUM, supra note 206, at 432, and is 
further explicated by Norm Daniels as “species-typical” functioning. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH:
MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 37 (2008).
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without the condition.209 And said disability becomes a handicap if the 
disadvantage is not socially redressed.210 The upshot of this view, then, is an 
aspiration for social policy: to limit the extent to which departures from the 
norm (impairments) become injustices (handicaps), by providing equitable 
redress when such departures show up as disadvantages (disabilities). 
To pursue this aspiration with clear-sighted principle, however, we need 
to bring into sharper relief which precise forms of disadvantage from 
disability properly fall within the ambit of distributive justice. Doing so 
requires linking up the foregoing with a wider analysis of the dimensions 
and sources of disadvantage that, more broadly, are germane to distributive 
justice. Debate on that score in the philosophical literature has yielded three 
main candidates of the appropriate index of advantage—welfare, resources,
and capabilities—deficits in which are eligible for distributive redress.211
Prosecuted at a high level of conceptual refinement, the upshot of that 
debate for present purposes is two-fold: convergence on one important set
of issues and division over some remaining, subtle yet significant, points of 
contention. First, convergence: proponents of each of the main candidates
agree that fairness requires holding individuals reasonably responsible in 
certain respects, principally: for which of their powers or capacities they 
develop and exercise, for which of their traits and preferences they cultivate 
and pursue, and for the prudent management of their affairs.212 All sides 
                                                                                                                         
209 This causal emphasis on the role of interactions between a person and their built and social 
environment in transforming departures into disadvantages—as opposed to a view that sees 
disadvantages as stemming solely from a person’s own constitution—is a central theme of the social 
model literature cited above.
210 Cf. NUSSBAUM, supra note 206, at 423 (defining a “handicap” as the competitive disadvantage 
resulting from a disability).
211 A significant catalyst of this debate has been the set of issues raised by disability and related 
cases of differential needs. See Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, Address at The Tanner Lecture on 
Human Values, 203–04, 215, 217–18 (May 22, 1979) (drawing on examples of special-needs individuals 
to launch a debate between welfare, resource, and capability views).
212 Taking the lead in this regard are advocates of “resources.” See RAKOWSKI, supra note 140;
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 297 (1981), 
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 86 
(2000). For agreement by defenders of welfare, see Arneson, supra note 137, at 77; Cohen, supra note 
137, at 907. For capability theorists, see G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and 
Capabilities, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 9–10 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993);
Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) 
Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1203 (1997); Amartya K. Sen, Plural Utility, 81 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 193, 209 (1981). Rawls is famously thought to be an important exception, and to 
reject any role for individual responsibility in distributive justice on deterministic grounds. But this is 
slightly misleading, in two respects. First, Rawls believed individuals should be held reasonably 
responsible for the tastes they cultivate and pursue. John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159, 168–69 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). And, second, 
although Rawls discounted any role in his theory for responsibility over the development and exercise of 
one’s capacities, his reasons for doing so were not a flat rejection of any such responsibility, but rather 
that it was simply “impracticable” to disentangle the (likely small) role of responsibility from other 
factors lying outside of individuals’ control. See RAWLS, supra note 9, at 89, 274. For criticisms of Rawls 
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agree, that is, that the locus of distributive concern should be on unchosen 
or “involuntary” sources of advantage and disadvantage.213 We may signal 
this, as we have throughout, by describing our aim in the language of 
enabling effective access to valuable outcomes, rather than in terms of 
securing the realization of outcomes per se.214
Where disagreement enters is in specifying the precise dimension(s) of 
advantage in which involuntary deficits are to be equitably redressed. A 
complex dialectic divides the three camps on this front; its central thread 
may be radically compressed as follows. For one group, the only sensible 
ultimate aim is to enable people to realize happiness according to their own 
lights, and so the proper index of advantage—to which all persons should be 
given equitable access—is subjective “utility” or “welfare,” understood as 
either preference satisfaction or hedonic enjoyment.215 Two objections 
facing this view, in particular, have been fundamental in prompting the 
search for alternatives.216 One is the long-standing difficulty of obtaining 
any reliable measure of such subjective utility, one that enables not just 
ordinal or qualitative rankings internal to a person, but cardinal comparisons 
of quantitative intensity, across persons.217 The other is a sense that, in any 
case, a focus on subjective end-states is ultimately misplaced for two distinct 
sets of reasons: (1) It holds hostage the value of an array of goods widely 
held to be important across different plans of life (from physical mobility to 
occupational opportunity) to the vagaries of persons’ subjective mental 
reactions or preferences—something especially troubling when such 
                                                                                                                         
in this latter respect, see Cohen, supra note 137, at 915, and Dworkin, supra, at 343. For Rawlsian 
criticism, in turn, of the emphasis placed on individual responsibility by theorists in the line of Dworkin 
and Cohen, see Anderson, supra note 153, at 308–11.
213 This is not to say that all those cited above agree on the precise respects in which individuals 
should be held reasonably responsible (or, where responsibility is a relevant consideration, on how to 
factor it in). But any such local differences are of less moment, for present purposes, than their broad 
areas of agreement on this front. Cf. infra note 244.
214 See supra text accompanying notes 118, 137.
215 See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315–16 (1955); Arneson, supra note 137, at 82 (“I take 
welfare to be preference satisfaction. The more an individual’s preferences are satisfied, as weighted by 
their importance to that very individual, the higher her welfare.”); Kenneth J. Arrow, Some 
Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 252–54 (1973) (book review); 
Louis Kaplow, Primary Goods, Capabilities, . . . or Well-Being?, 116 PHIL. REV. 603 (2007).
216 Two other important criticisms of the view—namely, that it is prone to giving weight to 
“offensive” and “expensive” preferences—are addressed by those who propose to launder or filter these 
out, on the basis of holding individuals reasonably responsible for not cultivating or pursuing them, or 
for shouldering the burden of their disregard in social policy. Arneson, supra note 137, at 78–80; 
Cohen, supra note 137, at 912–14. 
217 See RAWLS, supra note 8, at 78–79 (motivating the case for “primary goods”—in particular, the 
resources of income and wealth—as the index of advantage for distributive justice based in substantial 
part on the need for an externally verifiable metric of advantage that has lower informational demands 
than interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility).
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reactions or preferences either (a) reflect a low valuation of the good, on
account of adapting to its dearth (in adverse or oppressive circumstances),218
or (b) are subject to being shaped by the very policy decision at hand (such 
as with the education of the young);219 and (2) it disconcertingly threatens to 
overextend the reach of distributive justice, making it a matter of political 
concern whether, for instance, someone happens to be unlucky in love.220
United in their criticisms of these perceived defects, partisans of the 
alternative camps divide over their proposed remedies. For both groups, the 
basic picture of persons as vessels of utility is entirely too passive and in 
need of replacement, by a conception of persons as active agents, 
responsibly authoring their own lives. Our focus, that is, should not be on 
providing access to end-states of happiness, but rather on effectively 
equipping persons with the means necessary for freedom or flourishing.221
One camp takes this to require that all persons be equitably furnished 
with “resources”: general, all-purpose means valuable for the pursuit of any 
of a wide array of diverse life plans.222 These consist primarily of income 
and wealth, but such “external” resources may also be used to address 
involuntary deficits in “internal” or personal resources, meaning mental and 
physical powers, and traits relevant to the effective pursuit of diverse life 
plans.223 This, of course, reintroduces the thorny problem of measurement 
or valuation: how should various deficits in personal powers and traits be 
valued for purposes of monetary redress? In theory, the resourcist ideal is to 
retain a subjectivist view, anchored in individuals’ own valuations of 
personal resources, in terms of opportunity costs in foregone external 
resources.224 In practice, however, the difficulties with directly 
implementing this ideal mean that we will have to rely on rough, often 
counterfactual, conjectures of inter-subjective averages as our guides—
                                                                                                                         
218 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 129–30, 136–37 (2000)
(discussing adaptation to oppressive circumstances); Cohen, supra note 137, at 943 (arguing that 
adapting to adverse or oppressive circumstances should not void one’s claim to compensation).
219 See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 
1733–34, 1733 n.316 (1988) (discussing endogenous preferences).
220 Anderson, supra note 153, at 287–88.
221 But see Cohen, supra note 212, at 22–26 (criticizing the “overly athletic” language of freedom 
used by resource and capability camps, as either mistaken if it means not redressing deficits in “traits” 
along with those in “powers,” or misleading if it does).
222 RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 19; Dworkin, supra note 212, at 307, 343–44; 
Rawls, supra note 210.
223 Broadening the ambit of “resources” to include personal powers and traits is an extension of this 
view, undertaken by Dworkin and Rakowski to fill a gap in its original formulation by Rawls—who put 
to one side the problem of personal differences to focus on what he considered the “basic case” of 
“normal” persons. RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 99–101; Dworkin, supra note 212, at 300–01; 
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001).
224 We are to ask, that is, what individuals with these deficits would themselves, in light of their 
particular ambitions and tastes, give up in external resources—and hence, in the pursuit of their other 
projects and preferences—to have these deficits ameliorated.
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asking, in essence, how much value would individuals, on average, across a 
diverse range of life plans, place on ameliorating such deficits.225
Disagreement on this last count is the main pivot of debate between the 
resource and capability views. Capability theorists agree with (indeed, 
largely initiated) the critique of the welfare view as too focused on subjective 
end-states.226 But in their reaction against subjective end-states, resourcists, 
on the capability view, swing too far in the other direction, of “fetishizing”
generic external means independent of what they can actually do for specific 
persons.227 The right locus of concern, on this view, lies midway between 
external means and subjective end-states: states of valuable 
“functioning”—of “being” (e.g., well-fed) and “doing” (e.g., reading, 
mobility)—that are tailored to individual persons and yet externally 
measurable and not reducible to their subjective satisfaction or enjoyment. 
Thus, for example, with respect to being well-fed, our focus should be 
neither on a generic quantity of external resources (be it dollars or food), nor 
on a person’s desire for or pleasure from a meal, but rather on a nutritional 
target (say, daily caloric needs), reaching which may require calibration to 
individual differences in, say, physiology.228 And what value should we 
place on meeting such targets? The capability answer is that we cannot 
shrink from—because there is no plausible alternative to—straightforwardly 
making substantive social judgments, concerning the contribution of various 
different states of being and doing to the good life, a life of “truly human” 
                                                                                                                         
225 See Dworkin, supra note 212, at 293, 296–99; RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 88–89, 92, 98–
100, 120–23, 126. At the center of both Dworkin’s and Rakowski’s proposals are hypothetical insurance 
devices that ask how much people would insure, on average, against the bad “brute luck” of an 
involuntary disability or health condition. Dworkin, supra note 212, at 315; RAKOWSKI, supra note 140,
at 132. Reliance on “offer” prices under ex ante uncertainty is, however, only one way to obtain 
conjectural (inter-)subjective valuations, and this particular method will tend to counsel only cost-
effective ameliorations, to result in a distributive principle along the lines of the “efficient progress” 
view. See supra pp. 46–47 (criticizing the efficient-progress view). Both authors express reservations 
about the method (and Rakowski proposes to supplement it with additional resource transfers of an 
indeterminate amount for the case of childhood, as opposed to adult-onset, disability)—but they urge it 
as superior to attempting full equalization or compensation. RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 99–101, 105; 
Dworkin, supra note 212, at 300–02. The trouble here lies not with the authors’ chosen space of 
concern—personal resources valued on a subjective basis—but, of course, with their telic-equality 
premise that the default is equalization in that space. The unattractive implications of that premise then 
drive them to adopt a method of subjective valuation that results in a concededly unsatisfactory 
alternative distribution. A better way forward, on the argument presented in Part II, would be to simply 
abandon the commitment to equalizing and instead embrace the commitment to giving comparative 
priority, so as to apply the principle of proportionate progress to their space of concern, i.e., personal 
resources, now (inter-)subjectively valued in a suitably revised way. See supra p. 44. 
226 See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
227 Sen, supra note 191, at 216, 218. As discussed in note 230, infra, this criticism may be restricted 
to cases of significant differences in individual powers and traits, or it may be pitched more broadly. 
228 Sen, supra note 191, at 216–18; Cohen, supra note 212, at 18–20.
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functioning.229 All persons, then, should be fairly equipped with 
“capabilities” for such functioning—meaning, equitably enabled to realize a 
diverse array of valuable states of being and doing deemed fundamental to 
human flourishing.230
To be sure, the gap between resource and capability views, as well as 
the distance between them and the welfare position, may be challenged or 
bridged in various ways.231 But for present purposes, the central contours of 
the competing positions are clear enough for us to turn to their concrete 
implications here.232 Involuntary disadvantages from disability are, then, 
                                                                                                                         
229 SEN, supra note 6, at 1–2, 4–5; Nussbaum, supra note 218; Cohen, supra note 212, at 21–28.
For the contemporaneous development in legal theory of a view along similar lines to the capability 
approach, see Fisher, supra note 219, at 1744–66. 
230 This is not to say that capability views need leave no room in distributive justice for subjective 
valuations over generic resources. That depends on the extent of their departure from resource views, 
which may proceed along any one of three broad levels. The most basic is to restrict the capability 
approach to those cases where both camps agree that differences in personal powers and traits render 
inadequate reliance on generic external resources—with the disagreement turning on how best to address 
that gap (i.e., via more subjective or more substantive valuations). An intermediate position is to expand 
the zone of substantive evaluations to various other states of being and doing that are also deemed 
fundamental to human flourishing and not to be left solely to subjective valuations (on account, say, of 
adaptive or endogenous preference-formation)—while still leaving room for the residual application of 
principles of distributive equity to generic resources left to subjective valuation. The most expansive 
view would be to limit the scope of distributive justice only to capability spaces, evaluated in substantive 
terms. 
231 Thus, with respect to redressing deficits in personal “powers,” to the extent that the resource 
position moves away from any purely subjectivist valuation, it can be seen to converge with the capability 
view—or, as some resourcists have it, the capability view converges with theirs. Compare Sen, supra 
note 211, at 217–18 (discussing the relation between utility, resource and capability views), with 
Dworkin, supra note 137, at 241–42 (same), Cohen, supra note 137, at 918 (same), DWORKIN, supra 
note 222, at 288, 296–98 (same), and AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 264–65 (2009) (commenting 
on Dworkin’s argument against capability). As we will see below, however, an important difference of 
sensibility in valuation—concerning “fungibility”—remains between these positions, one with 
significant implications in the educational setting. See infra notes 237–39 and accompanying text. 
Another prominent controversy, passed over as too tangential to our purposes here, concerns the extent 
to which, under the resource and capability views, redress should be available not only for deficits in 
personal “powers” but also in “traits” (such as having a gloomy disposition or unchosen “expensive 
tastes”)—and, if redress for the latter is available, whether this does not collapse these positions, at least 
in this regard, into something like a welfare view. For resources, see Dworkin, supra note 212, at 301–
04; Cohen, supra note 137, at 922–31; RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 47–54; G.A. Cohen, Expensive 
Taste Rides Again, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS: WITH REPLIES BY DWORKIN 3, 5 (Justine Burley ed., 
2004). For capability, see Cohen, supra note 212, at 26–28. This is tangential to our focus because all 
parties to this debate agree that deficits in traits associated with disability should be addressed by resource 
and capability views and can be done so in a manner retaining their distinction from the welfare 
position—although, again, not perhaps their distinction from each other. Cf. Cohen, supra note 212, at 
22–26 (agreeing that the capability view may remain distinct from the welfare view in redressing deficits 
in traits, but arguing that when dealing with traits or “beings”—as opposed to powers or “doings”—the 
language of “capability” for “functioning” is inapt, because misleadingly “athletic,” and proposing 
instead access to “midfare” as more suitable in such cases).
232 We may note for completeness that one final front of debate concerns, naturally, the appropriate 
principle of distributive equity to apply to these competing spaces of concern—to ensure that access to 
advantage, however specified, is indeed provided fairly for all. Virtually all participants in this debate 
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germane targets for distributive concern when they implicate persons’ access 
to one or another of these three ultimate goods: welfare, resources or 
capabilities. And in the specific context of education, to which we now 
return, the key questions concern the ways and extent to which different 
forms of educational (dis)advantage may be measured and compared or 
traded off against one another, in light of competing views on what 
dimensions and sources of (dis)advantage should be our focus of concern in 
the educational setting.
C. Accommodation Beyond the Core Case
1. Trading Off Across Educational Spaces
We return to the issue posed by the more complex cases: should a 
student with a disability be eligible to receive IEP benefits even when he or 
she is performing at an overall academic level that is average or above?233
                                                                                                                         
have adopted—either as overall principles for their spaces of concern or specifically to address 
disadvantages from disability—variations of the maximin/leximin, sufficiency or efficiency principles 
criticized in Part II, supra. The burden of that Part, of course, was to argue for the superiority of the 
principle of proportionate priority to these alternatives—and the central thrust of its argument continues 
to apply irrespective of one’s view of the appropriate index of advantage to which equitable access should 
be provided.
233 The question itself may arise under either of two aspects of the IDEA. A first is where the student 
is performing at an average or higher level prior to any IEP, in which case the issue is whether they 
should be eligible to receive any special education benefits at all. The second is when the student reaches 
that level only after some special educational assistance, in which case the question becomes whether 
they merit any further assistance.* While this difference—between “eligibility” for any benefits and
“adequacy” of existing benefits—may matter in certain contexts, we can abstract from it here to focus 
on the core substantive question presented in either setting: should any (further) special-educational 
resources be devoted to a student with a disability when her or his overall educational development is 
already at an average or above-average level?
* To be more precise, the issue may arise under any of three distinct legal provisions of the IDEA, 
falling within two broad areas of IDEA analysis, namely: (1) whether a student is eligible for an IEP’s 
“special education and related services,” and (2) whether the benefits provided by a mandated IEP are 
adequate. Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 187–88, 192–94 (1982). For eligibility, (1) a student must suffer from 
a statutorily enumerated “learning” disability (or fall within a limited exception where states may at their 
discretion so designate children aged three to nine who are “experiencing developmental delays”) and 
(2) the disability must (a) “adversely affect” her or his “educational performance” (b) such that she or he 
“by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012); 
id. at § 1401(3)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.8(a)(1), (c)(1) (2016); see also Garda, supra note 197, at 457–
58 (describing how IDEA defines a “child with a disability”). Eligibility analysis serves, then, as a first 
filter for special educational benefits, by determining who is entitled to receive any such benefits. 
Adequacy analysis then operates as a second filter, prescribing how much benefits are due for those 
passing the first hurdle. 
The eligibility filter, in turn, may operate in either of two ways. One is where the requirement that 
a learning disability “adversely affect” a student’s educational performance is given a restricted meaning, 
not to require something more than simply making the student educationally worse off than they would 
otherwise be without the disability, but rather something along the lines of the student being educationally 
worse off than the average student, either overall or in specific areas of learning and skills. Alternatively, 
we might take a relaxed or expansive view of what counts as “adversely affecting” educational 
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So far we have encountered two broad answers. A reconstructed 
majority view says “no,” on the grounds that students with disability should 
be eligible for special concern or priority only so long as they are overall 
worse off than the average, non-disabled, student. And a reconstructed 
minority view says “yes,” on the grounds that students with disability should 
be eligible for special concern or priority so long as they are worse off than 
they would otherwise be, without the disability (i.e., so long as they are 
detrimentally affected by the disability, even if their overall level is average 
or above).
Both these responses, however, may be too coarse-grained when we take 
into account the variety of cases that can arise. Consider the following, 
illustrative of the main types of distinct cases possible here: 
x Case (A): The disability makes the student below average in many,
even most, areas of learning or skills, but still not overall, due to her 
or him being very above average in one or a few areas (e.g., a student 
with autism having extremely high math and related skills). 
x Case (B): The disability makes the student below average in one or 
a few concentrated areas (e.g., reading or writing) but not overall, 
due to her or him being above average enough in other areas. 
x Case (C): The disability causes deficits in one or more capacities 
(such as in processing auditory information or perceptual skills) but 
these are not tightly linked or severe enough to show up as discrete 
deficits in any specific educational area sufficient to make her or 
him below average in that isolated respect. Rather, the disability has 
a diffuse impact that, nevertheless, does not result in he or she being 
below-average overall (due to he or she having compensating 
above-average capacities in other respects). 234
On first impression, the majority view would seem to counsel the same 
position in all three cases, against the student being eligible for any special 
concern or priority, on the same grounds that they are overall average or 
above average. Why? Because, although students with disabilities may still 
face deficits or disadvantages in some capacities that are relevant to 
educational development and distributive concern, the fact that on the whole 
they are nevertheless average or above suggests that in other respects they 
are “gifted.” They enjoy, that is, in these other educational respects—that 
are also relevant to distributive concern—surpluses or advantages vis-à-vis 
                                                                                                                         
performance (to include any detrimental effect on the student’s performance), but then take a more 
stringent view of when the student is deemed to “need” special education, as requiring something more 
than simply deriving any benefit from such education, but rather something along the lines of needing it 
to attain an average level of overall or disability-specific performance. See Garda, supra note 197, at 
481–91 (reviewing authority for each of the two approaches and advocating for the latter as the key filter 
in eligibility analysis).
234 See Conrad Weiser Area Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 603 A.2d 701, 702, 704 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1992) (discussing a student who was “gifted” but deficient in “the area of writing expression”). 
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other students, advantages that, on the whole, more than offset their 
disability deficits. As a result, they are no longer disadvantaged, “overall.”
Even for those who find this view generally persuasive, however, case 
(A) may give some pause. (A)-type cases, involving very lopsided 
development of skills and learning, raise doubts about the propriety of using 
a raw average across all areas, due to the potential distortion from a huge 
surplus in one area. An overall average, that is, may sometimes be deceptive 
due to raw educational scores not properly tracking the underlying value of 
attainments in different educational domains, as these might be assessed on 
any plausible theory of the educational good. By analogy to the diminishing 
marginal utility value of money, there may be a diminishing “marginal 
goodness value” of raw educational scores, whether “goodness” is 
understood in terms of capabilities, personal resources or welfare.235
Therefore, before trading off deficits and surpluses across educational areas 
to determine a student’s overall score and position vis-à-vis others, we may 
first need to ensure that each area is being properly valued or adjusted. This 
may be achieved more qualitatively, by making rough judgments of when 
there seems to be too high an imbalance across areas—i.e., a concentration 
of surpluses or deficits in one or a few that merits some adjustment before 
averaging—or more quantitatively, by applying some discounting function 
to raw scores before averaging them.
Suppose, then, that we have properly valued or adjusted distinct 
educational areas before comparing deficits and surpluses across them to 
yield an overall average. This already provides some distance from the 
majority view in its initial, unrefined version. Do there remain any further 
grounds for departing from that view, so as to accord eligibility for priority 
to students with disability even when they are average or above in the, now 
properly valued or adjusted, space of overall educational performance? A 
refined majority view would say to stop here. 
Some, however, may want to press further and argue for continued 
eligibility in at least some type-(B) cases, where a student is doing well 
enough in most areas but quite poorly in one or a few, albeit not so poorly 
as to bring down her or his overall average to below the median (even after 
we have made any plausible adjustments to raw scores before averaging).236
                                                                                                                         
235 To forestall misunderstanding, it is worth emphasizing that this question—of how properly to 
measure the benefits secured by an expenditure of educational resources—is sharply distinct from the 
question at the heart of our discussion of distributive principles in Part II, namely what kind of priority 
to accord to benefits (so measured) for students with disability vis-à-vis benefits for other students. By 
way of analogy: within welfarist analysis, the (positive) question of what utility curves are most plausibly 
associated with money is distinct from the (normative) question of what distribution of utility should be 
deemed fair, for purposes of adopting a specific social-welfare function. 
236 Cf. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 392, 400, 408–09 (5th Cir. 2012) (student 
scoring quite well in most areas, including math and social studies, but consistently poorly in writing 
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What might lie behind this position, of basing eligibility not on disadvantage 
in overall educational development, but on disadvantages specific to discrete 
areas of learning and skills? Most plausibly, a sense that not only should we 
make adjustments in our valuation of raw scores before averaging them 
across areas, but also that in fact we should go farther and sharply curb 
tradeoffs across areas of learning or skills altogether, even when they are 
duly adjusted or valued. Why? Because such skills and learning are 
“incommensurable,” going to fundamentally distinct aspects of educational 
development, each having independent qualitative value that is not sensibly 
compared or traded off against the others.237 In other words, this position 
counsels that we adopt a kind of “sphere-specificity” approach to areas 
within educational advantage, as opposed only to between education and 
other domains (e.g., health), as was discussed above.238
Proponents of two of the three prominent candidate metrics of 
distributive justice—welfare and resources—are unlikely to be moved by 
such a position. These camps tend, by and large, to eschew any such sharp 
forms of incommensurability.239 And although practical considerations 
might lead them to accept boundaries between education and other domains 
for purposes of real-world policy decisions, these are unlikely to extend to 
restrictions on comparisons and tradeoffs within education, across discrete 
areas of skills and learning. 
By contrast, a distinguishing feature of the capability camp is precisely 
its insistence on an irreducibly plural set of capacities as the relevant foci for 
distributive concern, so that distributive principles apply primarily within, 
rather than across, such capacities.240 Does this lend support for barring all 
                                                                                                                         
composition, held to merit further accommodation by the district court and dissent on appeal, but not by 
the majority).
237 See MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1993); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN 
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 
(Ruth Chang ed., 1997); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321 (1986).
238 See supra Part I.B.3.
239 Both camps adopt metrics of advantage that assume, explicitly or implicitly, more or less full 
commensurability or fungibility across different goods. To be sure, many welfarists have expressed 
theoretical reservations about commensurable—or cardinal and interpersonally comparable—notions of 
utility, and such reservations have also played an important part in motivating the development of the 
resourcist alternative. Rawls, supra note 121, at 91–92; Arrow, supra note 215, at 246; Harsanyi, supra
note 215, at 309. Nevertheless, for any workable form of the welfare view, some way of making 
interpersonal comparisons of utility is needed, and typically such comparisons are made in a cardinal or 
“as if” quasi-cardinal fashion, along a single-scale measure of quantitative intensity. See Kaplow, supra 
note 215, at 603 (discussing whether metrics can be used to convert resources into a single dimension). 
Resourcists, for their part, rely on income and wealth as a fungible, all-purpose means for measuring 
social opportunity costs across goods and persons. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
240 Sen, supra note 212; Cohen, supra note 212, at 9; Martha Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: 
The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1203 
(1997). Whether this commits capability views to eschew “general” distributive justice—meaning, the 
redress of overall or residual forms of disadvantage via generic or fungible means, such as 
money—depends on their scope of divergence from resource views, as discussed above in note 230.
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intra-educational tradeoffs, across any areas of skills and learning? Likely 
not. Although sphere-specificity between education and other domains such 
as health is given stronger support by the capability view (as a matter of 
principle, not just practical policy), this is because such boundaries likely 
track (even if only roughly) fundamental underlying distinctions between 
discrete kinds of human goods. Any such correspondence, however, is 
unlikely to obtain within the educational sphere. It is doubtful, that is, that 
the large number of different subject areas in which schools regularly assign 
educational scores tightly map on to the—typically quite few—capacities 
plausibly specified by capability theorists as fundamentally distinct goods 
or spaces of concern.241
More plausible is that, stimulated to further theoretical reflection by the 
kinds of complex cases presented by disability accommodation, we might 
begin to carve out a few core aspects of educational development as going 
to distinct, fundamental forms of knowledge and skills, such that each merits 
its own, independent valuation for distributive purposes. For those drawn to 
this position, suggestive leads in this regard might be provided by those 
state-court constitutional decisions that have identified a series of discrete 
dimensions of learning, skills and activities, in each of which schools are 
charged with ensuring all students are effectively equipped.242
Taking stock, we can now distinguish between three main variants of 
the majority position. A pure view rejects eligibility in all three cases, 
including type-(A) cases of lopsided development. A first refinement 
accepts the need to adjust valuations in cases of lopsided development, but 
otherwise sticks to its guns. A second refinement, propelled by 
type-(B) cases, accepts a further need to draw lines between fundamentally 
distinct, independently valuable, spaces of educational development, and 
curb the application of priority principles to within, rather than across, such 
spheres. 
                                                                                                                         
241 Cf. NUSSBAUM, supra note 122, at 78–79 (within a total of ten irreducibly distinct capability 
spaces, specifying four areas plausibly relevant to educational policy, each characterized in very broad 
terms: “senses, imagination and thought,” “emotions,” “practical reason,” and “affiliation”).
242 See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, at 877 (W. Va. 1979) (specifying eight dimensions in which 
schools must enable students’ development up to their full capacity: literacy, math, creative arts, 
knowledge of government, social ethics, self-knowledge, work skills, and recreational pursuits); Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (specifying seven dimensions for 
sufficient development: oral and written communication; knowledge of economic, social, and political 
systems; understanding of government processes; self-knowledge; arts; academic or vocational training; 
academic or vocational skills). As discussed supra Part II.B, the distributive principles these decisions 
are most plausibly seen to instantiate—maximin and robust sufficiency, respectively—face serious 
drawbacks. However, nothing prevents us from adapting their views and applying instead the principle 
of proportionate progress to their conceptions of the appropriate spaces of distributive concern (or to any 
suitably revised versions of such conceptions we settle upon after further reflection).
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What, finally, of a fourth position, one that would make further 
refinements so as to accommodate type-(C) cases, involving a diffuse effect 
of disability across many areas but not one so strong as to make the student 
worse off than the average in any specific significant area (due to he or she 
having compensating above-average capacities in other respects)? To 
embrace this would be to argue for so fine-grained a view of the relevant 
spaces of distributive concern as to dovetail with the heart of the minority 
position: namely, to adopt a narrowly targeted, disability-specific space for 
distributive concern and either to ignore, or to bar tradeoffs against, other, 
non-disability-specific sources of advantage and disadvantage. 
2. Disability and Other Sources of Educational Disadvantage
What might be the justification for the minority view just stated, one 
sometimes going under the label of “disability remediation”?243
Reconstructed as a view of distributive justice, its premises run as 
follows: (a) the relevant target space for distributive concern is a narrow, 
disability-specific capacity, such that a person with that disability is virtually 
by definition relevantly worse off than others, so as to merit distributive 
priority; and (b) we should not factor in any other respect in which such a 
person may be educationally advantaged or better off, so as to reduce the 
degree of priority they should be accorded. Or, in a qualified version 
of (b): we should not factor in any non-disability sources of educational 
advantage or disadvantage, deeming them irrelevant to the task at hand, of 
according distributive priority purely on the basis of disability.
Such a position—of disregarding as irrelevant to distributive concern 
any other source of involuntary educational disadvantage (such as 
socio-economic status, family context, cultural or linguistic background or 
innate differences in ability not classified under disability)—is difficult to 
defend in principle.244 And although some more practical considerations 
may be marshaled in its favor, none of these is ultimately persuasive. 
One might seek to justify restricting our focus to disability-based 
sources of disadvantage on the ground that we are working here within a 
disability-specific legislative scheme. But it seems inconsistent, even 
unprincipled, to advance a robust interpretation of that scheme’s 
                                                                                                                         
243 Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 215 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 
690 F.3d. 390, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2012). It bears noting that the label of “disability-remediation” is 
somewhat misleading, at least for that variant of the minority position being considered here. Even 
adopting the position that students with disability should be eligible for special concern so long as their 
disability is not fully remedied, the form that special concern would take here is priority according to the 
principle of proportionate progress (applied to the minority’s target space for distributive concern, 
namely a narrow, disability-specific capacity). And this distributive principle does not counsel full 
remediation, but rather continued priority only so long as the student’s potential for improvement, in the 
disability-specific capacity, remains significant enough that her or his proportionate gain in that space 
continues to be comparatively greater than that of other potential recipients. 
244 In particular, it would find no support from any of the main contending views on the appropriate 
locus of distributive concern. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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commitments toward students with disability on the basis of an analysis of 
distributive justice, but then fail to follow through on that analysis’s 
implications when they run in a contrary direction.
A second argument may be that disability tracks particularly salient 
forms of educational disadvantage, ones that tend to be especially urgent 
compared to other, perhaps more nebulous, sources of disadvantage. Indeed,
it might be thought that with these other sources, unchosen aspects of 
advantage and disadvantage entangle more inextricably with factors held 
reasonably to lie within students’ personal responsibility, making them less 
eligible candidates for redress on most views of distributive fairness. Yet, it
is precisely this salience of the disadvantages from disability—and its 
potential for abuse through expansive diagnoses of “disability”—that critics 
of IDEA accommodation point to as fostering an unjustified, and potentially 
distorting, form of “special treatment.”245 One that unfairly vaults a 
particular set of educational disadvantages over others that are, at least in 
principle, equally germane.
Finally, disabilities may often pose “extra-educational” hurdles, 
i.e., disadvantages outside the educational setting. And so, a third argument 
might run, any extra solicitousness shown toward the disadvantages of 
disability in educational policy might be justified, or at least excused, on 
grounds of partially compensating for these “outside” deficits. The main 
trouble246 with this position is that it bumps up against all the reasons 
canvassed above for why analysis of the fair distribution of educational 
resources should remain internally cabined, restricting its comparisons and 
tradeoffs to the domain of educational development.247
To sum up: both the majority and minority positions, in their initial form, 
merit reconsideration once we sift them through a more fine-grained analysis 
of the appropriate space(s) of distributive concern. The upshot? 
Considerable support for one or both of two possible refinements to the 
majority view: (a) adjusting our valuations of raw educational scores before 
making priority comparisons across students; and (b) drawing distinctions 
between discrete spaces of educational development deemed independently 
valuable, to restrict the application of priority principles to within, rather 
                                                                                                                         
245 See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 92.
246 A secondary problem is that some nondisability sources of disadvantage may also present 
hurdles outside of education that merit redress.
247 See supra Part I.B.3; supra text accompanying notes 237–242. This is not to say that 
extra-educational deficits associated with disability should remain unaddressed; only that they are not 
best addressed through the diversion of educational resources as a compensating medium. In this 
connection, it bears emphasizing that even after all “sphere-specific” deficits—i.e., deficits in various 
individual domains like education and health—have been equitably redressed internally, there may well 
be persons who remain in a state of “residual” (unaddressed) or “overall” (composite) disadvantage that 
merits further priority, as a matter of “general” distributive justice. This, however, is likely best pursued 
through more generic means, such as monetary transfers (leaving open here the question of what 
institutional mechanism may be most apt for effecting such transfers).
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than across, such zones. Adopting these would take us some way toward the 
minority view, but still stop significantly short of it. Further steps in that 
direction, so as to single out disability as the sole source of educational 
disadvantage meriting distributive concern, would seem unjustified.
CONCLUSION: DISTRIBUTIVE EQUITY IN LAW AND POLICY
What might the principle of proportionate priority mean for other areas 
of law and policy besides educational accommodation for disability? To ask 
this backs us into a prior question: does distributive justice have any direct 
bearing on the modes of analysis used in different areas of law and policy? 
This Article has suggested that the answer may be “yes” more often than 
is commonly thought. It has done so by tackling the two fundamental 
obstacles to the pursuit of distributive equity in law and policy. First, from a 
legal-institutional perspective it has shown that, contrary to a common 
perception, questions of distributive equity—or of prioritizing across 
similarly legitimate claims to resources in order to ensure fair access to a 
substantive benefit for all—may not only arise organically, internal to the 
distinct concerns of a particular field of law and policy, but also sometimes 
lie at its very center. Second, from a philosophical perspective, the Article 
has confronted head-on the two fundamental normative questions of 
distributive justice—namely, “what is fairness” in access, and “fair access 
to what”—by advancing a new principle of distributive equity and 
examining its application to different candidate spaces of distributive 
concern.
For what other areas of law and policy might these arguments be
germane? Where else, that is, might questions currently viewed through 
other lenses—such as antidiscrimination, equality of opportunity, rights, 
corrective justice, efficiency or cost-effectiveness—be better conceived as
ones of delimited distributive equity, or fair access to substantive benefits in 
accord with claims of distributive priority cabined to that domain? Although 
detailed consideration of further applications is clearly beyond our present 
scope, a few suggestive illustrations may be ventured—less as definitive 
conclusions than as possibly fruitful lines for future inquiry.
Two extensions of the argument, closely adjacent to our central focus 
here, may have been glimpsed already: educational justice besides disability 
and disability accommodation outside of education. Should educational 
justice in general be viewed in terms of distributive equity, with redress 
guided by proportionate priority? Doing so would advance distinct answers 
to two of the central questions of educational policy, namely: what sources 
of educational disadvantage should we seek to redress as a matter 
educational equity (e.g., income, minority status, family background, innate 
differences in ability not classified under disability); and what distributive 
principle should guide our expenditure of resources in pursuing such 
redress? A central lesson of the present analysis is that our answers to these 
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two are more deeply intertwined than is often thought. Specifically, if, in our 
answer to the first question, we reach beyond fair equality of opportunity to 
pursue distributive equity—in contrast to one prominent group of 
scholars248—then neither of the prominent answers to the second 
question—equality or sufficiency249—retains much appeal. Once our focus 
shifts, that is, from correcting imperfections to a fair competition for grades 
to redressing involuntary barriers accessing to educational development, 
then the attractions both of equality (as “leveling the playing field”) and of 
sufficiency (as less demanding than equality) fall away. While their 
respective drawbacks—implausibility for equality and indeterminacy for 
sufficiency—come to the fore. Perhaps more promising than trying to 
“blend” the two in an unstable compromise—one unsure in its footing in
underlying principle and indeterminate in practical guidance—is to jettison 
both commitments, and adopt in their stead comparative priority.250
How about accommodation of disability outside of education? Should it 
enter a new phase, progressing from facial discrimination to discriminatory 
disparate impact to, now, inequitable disparate impact? This possibility was 
briefly sketched above, where a parallel impasse to the one facing courts 
under the IDEA was shown to face courts under the RA and ADA.251 Does 
it call for a parallel resolution? Arguably yes, although surely the precise 
contours—and even perhaps the general aptness—of the resolution will 
depend on the aims specific to the diverse settings of employment, housing, 
transportation, architecture, and so forth. In one setting, however, we can be 
confident of strong parallels: health. As in education, so in health our aim is 
to secure effective access to a substantive good of fundamental importance. 
And again, persons with disability are differentially-situated in respect of 
that aim on account of a conversion deficit, in translating a given bundle of 
                                                                                                                         
248 Jencks, supra note 121, at 520; Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Putting Educational Equality 
in Its Place, 3 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 444, 445–46 (2008).
249 See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 345–47
(2006) (reviewing debate between equality and sufficiency views); William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When 
“Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters,
56 EMORY L.J. 545, 606–13 (2006) (arguing for equality against sufficiency); Joshua Weishart, 
Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 478–79 (2014) (reviewing debate 
between equality and sufficiency views).
250 See Liu, supra note 249, at 345–47 (offering a blend of equality and sufficiency); Weishart, 
supra note 249, 478–479 (offering a blend of equality and sufficiency). Notably, neither Professors Liu 
nor Weishart focus on what this Article identifies as the fundamental difficulties facing equality and 
sufficiency views—namely, the basic implausibility of equalizing-as-sameness in matters of distribution 
and the under- or over-inclusive difficulties stemming from sufficiency’s eschewal of a comparative 
focus. Underpinning both authors’ discussions is their acceptance of the equation of a comparative focus 
with the aim of equalizing—an equation that, as discussed in supra note 161, is common to the 
philosophical literature more generally and which, of course, it has been the central thrust of the present 
argument to pry apart. 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 102–07.
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means (healthcare) into valuable ends (positive health outcomes). So our 
task, again, is to correct for the insensitivity of any merely formal equality 
to their special needs. And in so doing there is no plausible alternative to 
tackling it as a question of distributive equity, of prioritizing across similarly 
legitimate claims to healthcare—the special needs of those with disability 
and the needs of other patients—to ensure equitable access to health for all.
Ensuring equitable access to health for all, more generally, points to a 
significant third extension. Persons with disability represent only one subset 
of a larger group of individuals with “differential needs” in health—others 
include patients with pre-existing conditions or “high risk” individuals more 
generally. A cornerstone of many healthcare reforms at the state and federal 
level in recent decades has been to ensure access to healthcare for such 
individuals, via guaranteed enrollment in private plans or expanded 
eligibility for public ones, alongside assurance that they receive, under such 
plans, non-discriminatory and “adequate” coverage for their individual 
healthcare needs.252 At the same time such reforms typically retain, as part 
of their mandate to keep costs under control, the use of “reasonable” cost 
containment methods, including cost-sensitive screening of different 
categories of care and courses of treatment.253 This poses in sharp form a 
dilemma long playing a central, if often underground, role in healthcare 
policy: at what point does a course of treatment, while providing some
medical benefit to the patient, nevertheless provide too small a benefit at too 
great a cost to qualify for coverage? Recourse to the notions commonly 
deployed—of facial discrimination, discriminatory disparate impact, 
“actuarial fairness,” “medical necessity,” and cost-effectiveness—are 
unlikely to be of much help in satisfactorily resolving it. Just as with the 
subset of patients with disability, so with the larger group of those with 
differential needs: the only plausible approach is one sounding in 
distributive equity. And among distributive principles, only proportionate 
priority attends simultaneously to both access and cost sides of the problem. 
Indeed, a central message of the proportionate priority view is its 
insistence that neither the “access” nor the “cost” dimensions of a problem 
can be addressed independently of the other. Equitable access, that is, 
integrates the two in a way making it indistinguishable from an analysis of 
equitable opportunity cost. The upshot of such an analysis—applicable to a 
wide range of fields—is to give clear articulation in law and policy to what 
                                                                                                                         
252 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2012); 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); An Act Providing Access to 
Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58, § 1; Individual Health Coverage, 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M (2006).
253 Id.
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should be our deepest commitments of principle: enabling all persons to 
have their lives go as well as is possible and fair.
AFTERWORD: ENDREW—SIGNS OF HOPE, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Shortly after this Article was completed, the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in the Endrew case referred to above,254 involving a 
challenge to the Tenth Circuit’s minimalist interpretation of the “some 
benefit” standard deriving from Rowley.255 This Afterword briefly evaluates, 
from the vantage of the argument set forth in this Article, the implications 
of Endrew for educational accommodation in this country.
In an unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court’s 
decision in Endrew consisted primarily of three planks: (a) an affirmation of 
Rowley’s insistence that the IDEA’s requirements for a satisfactory IEP do 
indeed contain a strong substantive component;256 (b) a rejection of both 
minimalist and maximalist views of when such substantive benefits should 
be deemed “adequate” for purposes of the IDEA,257 which the Court also 
took Rowley to stand for;258 and (c) the articulation of a new “appropriate 
progress” standard for evaluating the adequacy of benefits,259 one ostensibly 
distinct from either the “some” or “meaningful” benefit standards that had 
been widely taken to be the prevailing options in the wake of Rowley.260
                                                                                                                         
254 See supra text accompanying notes 4, 43, 84–85.
255 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 997–98 (2017).
256 Id.
257 Id. at 992, 997–99.
258 Id. at 995–96. 
259 See id. at 999 (“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP 
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.”); see also id. (“[T]he progress contemplated by the IEP must be appropriate in light of 
the child’s circumstances . . . .”); id. at 1001 (“The IDEA demands more [than merely exceeding de 
minimis benefits]. It requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make 
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”).
260 Three points bear noting regarding the relationship of Endrew’s “appropriate progress” standard 
to Rowley. First, the Endrew Court took the view that Rowley did not articulate any standard, emphasizing 
in this regard Rowley’s statement that it “declined to establish any one test for determining the adequacy 
of educational benefits.” Id. at 997. Although the Endrew Court cited this statement in rejection of the 
Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Rowley as having articulated a “some” benefit standard (an interpretation 
shared by a majority of circuits), the Court’s rebuke would also seemingly apply to that minority of 
circuits, most prominently the Third, that have derived a “meaningful” benefit standard from Rowley
(this latter went unmentioned by the Court). For a review of the longstanding pedigree, amongst both 
circuit courts and commentators, of the derivation of the “some” and “meaningful” standards from 
Rowley, see supra Part I.A. Second, the Endrew Court offered its “appropriate progress” standard as 
simply an elaboration of Rowley, being a more concrete specification of the “general approach” that 
Rowley and the IDEA already “point[ed] to.” Id. at 999. Nevertheless, and third, it is clear that, 
substantively, the “appropriate progress” standard is more demanding in its requirements than the more 
minimalist “some benefit” interpretation of Rowley. The latter’s relation to more demanding versions of 
the “meaningful benefit” interpretation remains, at present, unclear.
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In respect of each of its first two prongs, the Court’s decision is a 
welcome clarion call moving forward. Both of these elements—namely, 
reaffirmation of a substantive view of the IDEA’s requirements and rejection 
of both minimalist and maximalist views of these—find strong support in 
the analysis given above.261
In its articulation of a new standard, however, the Court’s performance 
was more mixed. On the one hand, the Court’s standard may be seen to 
dovetail with the one advanced in the preceding pages: that students with 
disabilities should be enabled to realize “appropriate progress” may be 
thought to fit hand in glove with the view that they be enabled to realize 
“proportionate progress.” What is “appropriate,” the Court declared, is a 
matter of what is “reasonable” in “light of the child’s circumstances.”262 And 
while the Court did not specify how “reasonably” to factor in students’ 
diverse circumstances, proportionate progress steps in to fill precisely that 
gap—by offering a view of what is reasonable in terms of what is fair across 
students, so that “appropriateness” is determined by looking to two sets of
comparative circumstances: how well each student is already faring and by 
how much each stands to improve. 
However, on the other hand, it must be admitted that not only did the 
Court not say this, but it also did not say much of anything at all. It is not 
just that the Court left unstated how to weigh or evaluate those 
circumstances it deemed relevant to factor in; it did not even pinpoint which 
aspects of students’ circumstances it deemed relevant to consider in the first 
place. What lies behind these silences? A fundamental lack of clarity, once 
again, on what our basic aim here should be. As with the “some” or 
“meaningful” standards, so here we need to ask: “appropriate” in light of 
what end? In pursuit of what guiding ideal, given which underlying 
commitments?
The commitments underlying the proportionate progress are, of course,
anchored in a specific conception of distributive fairness, of what it means 
to give all students equitable access to a substantive benefit, educational 
development. But the Court in Endrew, despite its clear embrace of a 
substantive view of the IDEA’s requirements, shied away from articulating 
this—or any other—guiding ideal to orient its efforts in meeting those 
requirements. As a result, its new standard faces difficulties parallel to those 
long plaguing the some and meaningful yardsticks it replaces: (a) not only 
is the language used to couch the standard quite vague—“appropriate” not 
being much of an improvement over “some” or “meaningful” in this 
                                                                                                                         
261 For the first element, see supra text accompanying notes 30–32 and 73–78; for the second, 
see supra Parts II.A.1–3. 
262 Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 992.
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respect;263 (b) but also, more importantly, absent any orienting purpose, we 
lack guidance on how to make the standard’s language more determinate in
application, whether by resolving ambiguities through direct appeal to our 
underlying commitments or, even, by identifying serviceable proxy factors
that may render it more workable in practice.264
The Court’s reticence in this regard is surely the greatest missed 
opportunity of the decision, a failure to meet the challenge set out over thirty 
years ago in Rowley: namely, to articulate an ideal that captures our 
“complex aspirations” under the IDEA, where both “equality of 
opportunity” and “equality of outcome” fail.265 That ideal, this Article has 
argued, is “equity of access”: reaching beyond all procedural concerns to 
focus directly on access to substantive benefits, it jettisons any commitment 
to equalizing, aiming instead to ensure all students fair access. Neither 
procedural nor substantive equality, our aspiration should be to achieve 
substantive equity, understood as a matter of distributive justice.
                                                                                                                         
263 Thus, if we substituted the terms “appropriate,” “some,” or “meaningful” for each other in the 
following, there would not seem to be any appreciable gain or loss in precision: “Each student must be 
enabled to realize ____ progress, that which is reasonable in light of the child’s circumstances.”
264 For discussion of the parallel difficulties facing existing standards, see supra Part I.A.1.
265 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
